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SUPRANATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
By Vanessa Franssen1 and Solène Vandeweerd2 
I.  Introduction:  
EU Administrative Criminal Law, What’s in a Name? 
In this contribution, we will engage in a comparative stocktaking of the existing 
sanctions and the safeguards in the field of ‘EU administrative criminal law’. with 
the aim to identify some general characteristics, distinguishing this field of law from 
‘traditional criminal law’ or, to use a concept introduced by the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR), the ‘hard core of criminal law’.3 
To make such a cross-section of EU administrative criminal law is not a straight-
forward task, for a number of reasons, which will be explained in more detail below: 
the highly fragmented character of EU administrative law, the fact that it constitutes 
a vertically and horizontally integrated regulatory system resulting inevitably in 
multi-level enforcement, and the difficulty to define both ‘administrative criminal 
law’ and ‘criminal law’. Next, the search for distinguishing characteristics which 
juxtapose ‘administrative criminal law’ with ‘traditional criminal law’ is also quite 
challenging, especially because the boundaries between those two concepts are not 
always clear. 
First, EU administrative law spans a wide variety of ‘administrative activity pur-
sued by the EU institutions’.4 Generally speaking, the term ‘EU administrative law’ 
refers to rules and procedures adopted by the EU to administer its policies, whether 
directly or indirectly.5 It covers a large variety of policy areas and consists of a com-
____________ 
1  Associate Professor at the University of Liège, Affiliated Senior Researcher at the KU 
Leuven and Member of the Brussels Bar. 
2  Trainee public prosecutor at the Court of the First Instance in Liège and Affiliated Re-
searcher at the University of Liège. She essentially wrote the parts relating to EU banking 
law. 
3  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 43. 
4  H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the Eu-
ropean Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 60. 
5  J. Schwarze, ‘European Administrative Law in the light of the Treaty of Lisbon: Intro-
ductory Remarks’, in: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Work-
shop on EU Administrative Law: State of Play and Future Prospects, 2011, at 9, available 
at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/divers/join/2011/453215/IPOL-
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prehensive body of rules, dispersed over primary and secondary EU legislation, com-
plemented by national legislation that is increasingly influenced by or simply imple-
menting EU law.6 Examples of EU administrative law can be found in the fields of 
competition law, financial markets, data protection, and public procurement,7 but 
also in the areas of agriculture and food safety.8 OLAF’s administrative anti-fraud 
investigations may be included as well. Considering the variety of policy fields that 
come within the Union’s competence, whether exclusive or shared with the Member 
States, EU administrative law today is a highly fragmented field of law. While the 
need to depart from a sector-specific approach in order to achieve more coherence 
has been the subject of an academic and institutional debate for quite some years 
now9 and several attempts have been made to formulate general principles of EU 
administrative law,10 it still holds true that EU administrative law is regulated by 
____________ 
JURI_DV(2011) 453215_EN.pdf (last accessed 12 June 2018). Cf. H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. 
Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 2011, at 4. 
6  H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the Eu-
ropean Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 12 and, for a more in-depth anal-
ysis of the sources of EU administrative law, 67 et seq. 
7  See e.g. S. Braconnier, ‘Public Procurement by the European Union Institutions’, in: 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Workshop on EU Adminis-
trative Law: State of Play and Future Prospects, 2011, at 113 et seq., available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/divers/join/2011/453215/IPOL-JURI_DV
(2011) 453215_EN.pdf (last accessed 12 June 2018). 
8  See M. Simonato, ‘The EU Dimension of “Food Criminal Law”’, 87 R.I.D.P. 97 (2016). 
See also B. van der Meulen and A. Corini, ‘Food Law Enforcement in the EU: Administra-
tive and Private Systems’, 87 R.I.D.P. 71 (2016). 
9  See e.g. J. Ziller, ‘Is a Law of Administrative Procedure for the Union Institutions Nec-
essary? Introductory Remarks and Prospects’, in: European Parliament, Directorate-General 
for Internal Policies, Workshop on EU Administrative Law: State of Play and Future Pro-
spects, 2011, at 29 et seq., available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/di-
vers/join/2011/453215/IPOL-JURI_DV(2011)453215_EN.pdf (last accessed 12 June 
2018); T. Evas, European Parliamentary Research Service, EU law for an open, efficient and 
independent European administration. Summary Report of the public consultation, July 
2018, available at: http://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2018/621830/EPRS_STU (2018)621830_EN.pdf (last accessed 16 April 
2019). 
10  See e.g. European Parliament, Resolution 2012/2024(INL) of 15 January 2013 with 
recommendations to the Commission on a Law of Administrative Procedure of the European 
Union; European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, The General Princi-
ples of EU Administrative Procedural Law, available at: http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/519224/IPOL_IDA(2015)519224_EN.pdf (last ac-
cessed 12 June 2018); European Parliament, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Administrative Procedure of the European Union’s 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, 2016, available at: http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/JURI/DV/2016/01-
28/1081253EN.pdf (last accessed 16 April 2019); European Parliament, Resolution 
2016/2610(RSP) of 9 June 2016 for an open, efficient and independent European Union 
administration, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0279+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#BKMD-8 (last accessed 16 
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sector or policy field and will likely continue to be so. As some authors have pointed 
out, ‘[t]he phenomenon of variation of decision-making mechanisms and institu-
tional rules across different policy fields (…) has proved to be a long-term charac-
teristic of European integration’.11 What is more, many of those policy areas are ‘in 
a permanent state of development’.12 This explains why ‘general EU administrative 
law exists almost exclusively in the form of general principles of law’.13 Yet, those 
principles do not necessarily adequately reflect the specificities of certain sectors or 
the different ways in which EU administrative law is enforced. 
Second, considering that the EU, in most sectors, is not exclusively competent and 
cannot directly apply nor enforce its rules throughout the Union, it needs to rely on 
the action of national authorities and their cooperation with the competent EU insti-
tutions, bodies, and/or agencies. Indirect administration is, indeed, the ‘default posi-
tion’.14 Therefore, when it comes to enforcing EU administrative law, the nature of 
such enforcement often depends on the choices made by national legislators, which 
may entrust either administrative or judicial authorities with that task, as long as this 
enforcement meets the EU’s criteria. EU administrative law is thus a prime example 
of a multi-level regulatory system,15 i.e. a complex legal system regulated by several 
levels of legislation, which correspondingly is enforced at different levels, by various 
national and supranational authorities, through administrative law, criminal law or 
hybrid legal regimes.16 As a result, the true nature of EU administrative law is not 
____________ 
April 2019). The European Commission, however, replied to the European Parliament that 
it was ‘not convinced that the benefits of using a legislative instrument that would codify 
administrative law would outweigh the costs’ and that a codification of EU administrative 
law would be ‘a highly complicated exercise’. European Commission, Follow up to the Eu-
ropean Parliament resolution for an open, efficient and independent European Union ad-
ministration, SP(2016)613, 4 October 2016, as quoted by T. Evas, European Parliamentary 
Research Service, EU law for an open, efficient and independent European administration. 
Summary Report of the public consultation, July 2018, at 20, available at: http://www.euro-
parl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621830/EPRS_STU(2018)621830_EN.pdf 
(last accessed 16 April 2019). 
11  B. De Witte, ‘Euro Crisis Responses and the EU Legal Order: Increased Institutional 
Variation or Constitutional Mutation?’, 11 EuConst 434 (2015), at 454. 
12  H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 916. 
13  H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 917. 
14  H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 12–13 and, for a more in-depth 
analysis, 259 et seq. 
15  Cf. H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 11–12. 
16  Considering the complexity of multi-level regulatory systems and enforcement, several 
research institutions have recently developed cross-cutting, interdisciplinary research pro-
grammes on this topic. For instance, the University of Utrecht has created RENFORCE, the 
Utrecht Centre for Regulation and Enforcement in Europe (http://renforce.rebo.uu.nl/) and 
the University of Luxembourg, in partnership with the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg 
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obvious to determine (some describe it as ‘multifaceted’17) because, even if the (or-
ganizational/institutional) label used by the EU legislator is ‘administrative’. it inter-
acts almost necessarily with criminal or other enforcement regimes at national level, 
and sometimes also at EU level. A clear illustration of such hybrid multi-level en-
forcement is the protection of the Union’s financial interests, which is the joint re-
sponsibility of the European Commission (in particular, its anti-fraud office OLAF), 
the Member States and the soon to be established European Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice.18 While OLAF has the power to conduct EU-wide administrative anti-fraud in-
vestigations, further investigations and enforcement take place at the national level, 
involving national administrative and judicial authorities,19 resulting in complex 
‘multidisciplinary investigations’.20 Competition law and, more recently, the protec-
tion of financial markets are other well-known examples. Market abuse, in particular, 
illustrates the delicate interaction between EU administrative law and EU approxi-
mation of criminal rules. 
Third, the concept of ‘administrative criminal law’ (or ‘administrative penal 
law’21) raises some questions. At first sight, the term may even seem a contradictio 
in terminis: how can a field of law be both administrative and criminal? In that re-
spect, the term ‘punitive administrative law’22 is probably less confusing because it 
clearly indicates that the label used by the EU legislator is administrative. This im-
plies that the applicable procedures, competent authorities, and sanctions provided 
by law formally belong to the field of administrative law. The adjective ‘punitive’ 
____________ 
for Procedural Law and the Fonds National de la Recherche of Luxembourg, has set up 
REMS, a doctoral training unit on enforcement in multi-level regulatory systems 
(https://wwwfr.uni.lu/recherche/fdef/research_unit_in_law/dtu_rems).  
17  H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 57. 
18  Council Regulation (EU) No 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced 
cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, OJ L 283, 31 
October 2017, at 1. 
19  L. Kuhl, ‘Cooperation between Administrative Authorities in Transnational Multi-
agency Investigations in the EU: Still a Long Road Ahead to Mutual Recognition?’, in: K. 
Ligeti and V. Franssen (eds.), Challenges in the Field of Economic and Financial Crime in 
Europe and the US, Oxford/Portland, Hart, 2017, at 135–165. 
20  K. Ligeti and M. Simonato, ‘Multidisciplinary Investigations into Offences against the 
Financial Interests of the EU: A Quest for an Integrated Enforcement Concept’, in: F. Galli 
and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Do labels still matter? Blurring boundaries between adminis-
trative and criminal law, The Influence of the EU, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, 2014, at 83. 
21  See e.g. A. Nieto Martín, ‘General Report on Food Regulation and Criminal Law’, 87 
R.I.D.P. 17 (2016), at 46. 
22  See e.g. K. Ligeti and M. Simonato, ‘Multidisciplinary Investigations into Offences 
against the Financial Interests of the EU: A Quest for an Integrated Enforcement Concept’, 
in F. Galli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Do labels still matter? Blurring boundaries between 
administrative and criminal law, The Influence of the EU, Brussels, Editions de l’Université 
de Bruxelles, 2014, at 81; A. Nieto Martín, ‘General Report on Food Regulation and Crim-
inal Law’, 87 R.I.D.P. 17 (2016), at 46. 
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has a restrictive and qualifying function: it signals that we are only referring to a 
specific subset of rules within the field of administrative law, namely those that have 
a punitive goal and present certain similarities to the punitive rules encountered in 
other fields of law, in particular criminal law, which is the ius puniendi par excel-
lence. Alternatively, one could use the concept of ‘quasi-criminal law’ or ‘quasi-
criminal enforcement’. which takes the opposite approach: it suggests there is a set 
of rules whose characteristics resemble those of ‘traditional criminal law’, without 
however fully corresponding to the latter (‘quasi’. almost).23 In what follows, we will 
use the terms ‘EU administrative criminal law’ and ‘EU punitive administrative law’ 
interchangeably. 
Last but not least, the concept of ‘criminal law’ is far from being unequivocal, 
especially due to the tensions between the broad autonomous meaning of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, based on the Engel criteria, and the much more restric-
tive, competence-based definition at the EU level.24 This will be further explained in 
Part III. 
Considering the foregoing difficulties and the overall purpose of this contribution, 
we have chosen to make a targeted cross-section of three areas of EU administrative 
criminal law that clearly relate to economic crime: competition law, banking law, 
and market abuse. In each of these areas, EU law gives considerable supervisory 
and/or sanctioning powers to EU institutions (the European Commission and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank) and authorities (the European Securities and Markets Author-
ity), which are shared or supplemented with sanctioning powers of national compe-
tent authorities. In that respect, they are quite unique sectors of EU administrative 
law.25 
Nevertheless, as the subsequent analysis will reveal, there are also important dif-
ferences between those three fields, making their cross-section particularly interest-
ing and relevant in view of defining the ‘general nature, characteristics and safe-
guards of EU administrative criminal law’. Whereas EU competition law is a well-
established field of EU administrative law, where the EU institutions rely on exten-
sive case experience, the EU legal framework on banking law, which clearly draws 
____________ 
23  See V. Franssen and C. Harding (eds.), Criminal and Quasi-criminal Enforcement 
Mechanisms in Europe: Origins, Concepts, Future, Oxford/Portland, Hart, forthcoming 
2020. 
24  For a more in-depth analysis of the term ‘criminal’ from a European perspective and 
the tensions between the EU and ECHR approaches, see e.g. V. Franssen, ‘La notion “pé-
nale”: mot magique ou critère trompeur? Réflexions sur les distinctions entre le droit pénal 
et le droit quasi pénal’, in: D. Brach-Thiel (ed.), Existe-t-il un seul non bis in idem 
aujourd’hui?, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2017, at 57–91; P. Caeiro, ‘The influence of the EU on 
the “blurring” between administrative and criminal law’, in: F. Galli and A. Weyembergh 
(eds.), Do labels still matter? Blurring boundaries between administrative and criminal law, 
The Influence of the EU, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014, at 175–190. 
25  Cf. H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H.Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 259–260. 
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inspiration from EU competition law, is much younger and is only starting to produce 
its first case examples. As far as market abuse is concerned, the EU legal framework 
was thoroughly revised in 2014 in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis in order to 
increase its effectiveness. To that end, the EU legislator decided to put in place an 
explicit two-pronged approach, involving both administrative and criminal enforce-
ment. 
To be clear, our ambition is by no means to analyse these three areas in an exhaus-
tive manner. As we are aiming at defining the general nature of EU administrative 
criminal law, the analysis will rather be centred on the specific sanctioning powers 
regulated and (wholly or partly) exercised at EU level (involving supranational but 
potentially also national competent authorities), a critical assessment of their crimi-
nal or punitive nature, and the safeguards guaranteed by the EU legal framework and 
the potential tensions with the minimum standards set in that respect by the ECtHR. 
By contrast, the enforcement action that is organized at the national level will be 
largely disregarded. 
Admittedly, in order to assess the potential criminal nature of those three fields of 
EU administrative law, it would also be useful to analyse more closely the investi-
gative powers of the competent authorities, especially because one of the sub-criteria 
used by the ECtHR to determine the criminal nature of a charge is the similarity 
between the administrative and the criminal procedure.26 Nevertheless, this would 
lead us too far and, more importantly, it would probably not alter the overall outcome 
of our assessment of the nature and general characteristics of EU administrative 
criminal law, and the need for adequate substantive and procedural safeguards. 
The structure of this contribution will be as follows. In Part II, we will give an 
overview of the sanctioning powers and various sanctions that apply in the three 
selected fields of EU administrative law. Next, in Part III, we will evaluate the nature 
of those sanctions in light of the case law of the ECtHR – are they really of an ad-
ministrative nature as indicated by their label, or are they instead criminal sanctions 
‘in disguise’? In function of the answer to that question, we will reflect, in Part IV, 
on the safeguards that apply and should apply in the field of EU administrative crim-
inal law. Part V will draw the main conclusions of our research, presenting some 
distinctive features of EU punitive administrative law, and reflect on the way for-
ward.  
____________ 
26  V. Franssen, ‘La notion “pénale”: mot magique ou critère trompeur? Réflexions sur les 
distinctions entre le droit pénal et le droit quasi pénal’, in: D. Brach-Thiel (ed.), Existe-t-il 
un seul non bis in idem aujourd’hui?, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2017, at 72–73. 
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II.  Sanctioning Powers and Applicable Sanctions in Three 
Areas of EU Punitive Administrative Law 
A.  Introduction 
In this Part, we will give an explorative overview of the sanctioning powers in 
three selected areas of EU punitive administrative law: competition law, banking 
law, and market abuse. The analysis below will describe the sanctioning powers that 
are regulated at EU level (but potentially exercised by national authorities too), the 
applicable types and levels of sanctions, and their personal and material scope of 
application. The question whether these sanctions are of a criminal nature will be 
addressed in Part III below.  
B.  EU Competition Law 
1.  Introduction 
The field of EU competition law being particularly vast, the analysis below will 
concentrate on that part of EU competition law that most likely entails sanctioning 
powers that are punitive in nature: EU antitrust law and, more specifically, ‘EU cartel 
law’. 
Cartels are a type of anti-competitive agreement prohibited by Article 101 of the 
TFEU. There is, however, no precise legal definition of cartels in EU law;27 one will 
search in vain for the word ‘cartel’ in Article 101 of the TFEU. Consequently, the 
outer limits of this infringement are somewhat imprecise.  
On its website, the European Commission describes cartels as follows:  
– A cartel is a group of similar, independent companies which join together to fix 
prices, to limit production or to share markets or customers between them. Action 
against cartels is a specific type of antitrust enforcement. 
– Instead of competing with each other, cartel members rely on each others’ [sic] 
agreed course of action, which reduces their incentives to provide new or better 
products and services at competitive prices. As a consequence, their clients (con-
sumers or other businesses) end up paying more for less quality. 
– This is why cartels are illegal under EU competition law and why the European 
Commission imposes heavy fines on companies involved in a cartel. 
____________ 
27  See C. Harding, Capturing the Cartel’s Friends: Cartel Facilitation and the Idea of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, 34 E.L. Rev. 298 (2009), 298; C. Harding and J. Joshua, Regulating 
Cartels in Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010 (2nd ed.), 11–16. 
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– Since cartels are illegal, they are generally highly secretive and evidence of their 
existence is not easy to find.28 
Put differently, cartels are prohibited horizontal agreements between undertakings 
about prices, output, markets, or customers, which restrict or distort competition and 
which are kept secret as much as possible.29 Typical examples are price-fixing, mar-
ket-sharing, output restrictions, and bid-rigging.30 These are also called ‘hard core 
cartels’. a notion that goes back to the 1998 Recommendation of the OECD.31 
Considering the above definition, cartels are clearly intentional infringements, 
meaning that corporations violate knowingly or even willingly the competition rules. 
The burden of proof is on the European Commission,32 but experience shows it in-
terprets the requirement of intent quite broadly, an approach which has been ap-
proved by the EU Courts (i.e. the Court of Justice and the General Court). It suffices 
that the undertaking was aware or should have reasonably been aware of its involve-
ment in a cartel.33 In practice this means that if someone somewhere in the undertak-
ing was engaged in a cartel, the undertaking as a whole can be held liable. 
Cartel members typically cover up their concerted practices to make sure that au-
thorities, customers, and consumers do not suspect anything. This secretive element 
adds to the offensive nature of cartel behaviour and, in combination with its collec-
tive element, recalls the idea of conspiracy, which is central to the cartel offence in 
____________ 
28  European Commission, Cartels: Overview, original emphasis, http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/cartels/overview/index_en.html (last consulted on 13 June 2018). 
29  For another approach, see e.g. C. Harding and J. Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010 (2nd ed.), at 12 (‘an organization of independent 
enterprises from the same or similar area of economic activity, formed for the purpose of 
promoting common economic interests by controlling competition between themselves’.). 
For a further analysis, see e.g. A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, 
and Materials, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 662 et seq. 
30  Cf. Article 101 (a)–(c) TFEU. 
31  OECD, Recommendation C(98)35 concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Car-
tels, 25 March 1998, point 2a) (‘A “hard core cartel” is an anticompetitive agreement, anti-
competitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, 
make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or di-
vide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce’.). 
32  See e.g. A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 115. 
33  For a telling example, see European Commission, Decision relating to a proceeding 
under Article 81 EC Treaty and Article 53 EEA Agreement (COMP/38.695 – Sodium Chlo-
rate), C(2008)2626 final, 11 June 2008, recital 401 (‘The lack of due diligence of the higher 
management of Atochem and Elf Aquitaine in exercising their duties, resulting in the alleged 
lack of awareness of the statutory and management bodies of Atochem and Elf Aquitaine of 
the actions taken by employees, cannot serve as an argument for the two companies to escape 
the liability for such actions’.). See e.g. I. Simonsson, Legitimacy in EU Cartel Control, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 309–310 and the case law references there. 
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the US.34 Harding argues that ‘the combination of 
conscious defiance and collusive action (…) lies at the heart of cartel delinquency’.35 
Furthermore, considering that cartels are notoriously hard to detect, investigations 
(and subsequent litigation) tie up a lot of resources of the European Commission. For 
these (and other) reasons the Commission decided to set up a leniency programme 
in 2006,36 thereby following the example of its American counterpart, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice. Two years later, the Commission also introduced the possibility 
of a settlement.37  More recently, in 2017, the Commission created a whistle-blower 
tool to encourage individuals who have inside knowledge of cartel activities to report 
them to the Commission.38 In the subsequent analysis, we will only briefly consider 
these enforcement strategies to the extent that they have an impact on the Commis-
sion’s fining practice. 
2.  The Sanctioning Powers of the European Commission 
–  General Overview 
The basic rules and principles of the sanctioning system applicable to cartels are 
laid down in Articles 101 and 103 of the TFEU, and concretized in Regulation 
No 1/2003.39 The European Commission (DG Competition) is the competent author-
ity at EU level to enforce the rules on EU competition law.  
The European Commission, however, is not solely competent. Since the entry into 
force of Regulation No 1/2003, the enforcement of EU competition law rules has 
become much less centralized than before, ‘essentially in an effort to increase en-
forcement capacity in the wake of the enlargement of the EU’.40 To facilitate the 
____________ 
34  See C. Harding, ‘Forging the European Cartel Offence: The Supranational Regulation 
of Business Conspiracy’, 12 Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 275 (2004), at 284 and 
293–294. 
35  C. Harding, ‘A Pathology of Business Cartels: Original Sin or the Child of Regula-
tion?’, 1 NJECL 44 (2010), at 58, emphasis added. See also ibid., at 54 (‘cartelists (…) 
knowingly defy clear legal prohibitions and use subterfuge to do so effectively: they are 
cognizant, contumacious and covert’.). 
36  Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ 
C 298, 8 December 2006, 17 (hereinafter: 2006 Leniency Notice).  
37  Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement proceedings in view of the adoption 
of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in 
cartel cases, OJ C 167, 2 July 2008, 1 (hereinafter: 2008 Settlement Notice). 
38  See European Commission, Anonymous Whistleblower Tool, http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/cartels/whistleblower/index.html (last accessed on 20 April 2019). 
39  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereinafter: Regulation 
No 1/2003), OJ L 1, 4 January 2003, at 1. 
40  M.J. Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law: Principles and Practices, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2014, at 1. 
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close cooperation of the European Commission and National Competition Authori-
ties, a European Competition Network was created.41 Today, national competent au-
thorities are thus significantly involved in the enforcement of EU competition law.42 
Most recently, a Directive was adopted to make National Competition Authorities 
‘even more effective enforcers’43 by putting in place ‘fundamental guarantees of in-
dependence, adequate financial, human, technical and technological resources and 
minimum enforcement and fining powers for applying Articles 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU’.44 This Directive has to be transposed into national law by 4 February 2021.45 
–  Personal Scope of Application 
Article 101 of the TFEU applies to ‘undertakings’, a concept which has been de-
fined by the Court of Justice (hereinafter also: CJEU) as ‘encompass[ing] every en-
tity engaged in an economic activity,46 regardless of the legal status of the entity or 
the way it is financed’.47 An undertaking is a ‘single economic unit’ which may con-
sist of multiple legal (or sometimes natural) persons (e.g. the parent company and its 
subsidiary). To define the single economic unit in a specific case is not always easy, 
especially considering the many mutations businesses and legal persons may go 
through, and this is often the subject of tough litigation before the EU Courts.48  
This focus on undertakings instead of legal entities or corporations has a huge 
impact on the scope of liability—the perpetrator is not a person but potentially a 
____________ 
41  See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html. 
42  A more in-depth analysis of the sanctioning powers and practices of national competent 
authorities in the field of EU competition law exceeds the scope of this contribution. For a 
further analysis, see e.g. M.J. Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law: Principles and Prac-
tices, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014, at 6–21 and 121–242; A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU 
Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th 
ed.), at 1013 et seq.; I. Van Bael, Due Process in EU Competition Proceedings, Alphen aan 
den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011, at 82 et seq. and 369 et seq. 
43  European Commission, Commission welcomes provisional political agreement by Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council on new rules to make national competition authorities even 
more effective enforcers, Strasbourg, 30 May 2018, available at: http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-18-3996_en.htm (last accessed on 11 April 2019). 
44  Recital 8 of the Preamble of Directive (EU) No 2019/1 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member 
States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market, OJ L 11, 14 January 2019, at 3. 
45  Article 34(1) of Directive (EU) No 2019/1. 
46  For a further analysis of the case law on what constitutes an ‘economic activity’, see 
A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 118–124. 
47  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 116, citing Case C-41/90, Höfner and Elser v. Ma-
croton GmbH (1991) and referring to case law where this definition was repeated.  
48  For a further analysis, see A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, 
and Materials, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 125–137. 
 EU Administrative Criminal Law 11 
group of persons—and, more important for this analysis, on the determination of the 
fine. For instance, the delimitation of the undertaking is determining for the maxi-
mum fine (infra). Still, while the perpetrators of cartel offences are undertakings, the 
addressees of the Commission’s fining decisions are, necessarily, legal persons, be-
cause fines can only be enforced against a person, not an economic entity.49 
–  Fines 
Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 gives the European Commission the power 
to impose fines for cartels and other agreements defined by former Articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty (current Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU). As such, Regulation 
No 1/2003 does not give much guidance to the Commission as to how it should de-
termine the fine in a concrete case.50 The Regulation sets the upper limit for the fine, 
namely ten per cent of the undertaking’s total turnover of the business year preceding 
the year in which the fine is imposed.51 But there is no minimum fine. Furthermore, 
the Regulation provides two ‘sentencing’52 criteria as it requires the amount of the 
fine to reflect the gravity and the duration of the infringement.53  
Considering the marginal guidance offered by Regulation No 1/2003, it was up to 
the European Commission to develop a fining policy and to determine which criteria 
matter for setting fines. The Commission’s fining policy as it exists today is the prod-
uct of many years of practice.  
In 1998 the Commission published for the first time guidelines explaining its 
method for calculating fines.54 The 2006 Guidelines on Fines replaced the 1998 
Guidelines and entered into force on 1 September 2006.55 These ‘new’ guidelines 
constitute an update of the old guidelines in the light of the practice the Commission 
____________ 
49  For a more in-depth analysis, see V. Franssen, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability and 
Groups of Corporations. Need for a More Economic Approach?’, in: K. Ligeti and S. Tosza 
(eds.), White Collar Crime: A Comparative Perspective, Oxford/Portland, Hart, 2018, at 
298–303. 
50  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 2011 (4th ed.), 1098. 
51  Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. 
52  The term ‘sentencing’ may sound a bit odd in the context of administrative proceed-
ings, even though these proceedings are criminal in the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. In es-
sence, though, the fining practice of the Commission is very comparable to the sentencing 
task of criminal courts. 
53  Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003. 
54  Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regu-
lation No 17 and Article 65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty, OJ C 9, 14 January 1998, 3 (hereinafter: 
1998 Guidelines on Fines). 
55  Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Reg-
ulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210, 1 September 2006, 2 (hereinafter: 2006 Guidelines on Fines). 
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had developed since 1998 and also incorporated the case law of the EU Courts in this 
respect.56  
Both sets of Guidelines were meant to bring transparency, impartiality, con-
sistency, and ‘some degree of legal certainty’57 with respect to the European Com-
mission’s fining practice.58 Nevertheless, the 2006 Guidelines also state expressly 
that the Commission ‘enjoys a wide margin of discretion within the limits set by 
Regulation No 1/2003’.59 In Part IV, we will briefly discuss the conformity of the 
Commission’s fining practice to the principle of legality.  
The Guidelines on Fines follow a two-step method. First, the Commission deter-
mines the basic amount of the fine, taking the value of sales as a starting point, which 
also reflects the gravity and duration of the infringement. Second, this amount will 
be adjusted in the light of specific circumstances which enable the Commission to 
set a more individualized fine for each cartelist. In particular, adjustments are based 
on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, the basic amount can be 
increased for the purpose of deterrence and reduced to avoid bankruptcy. The ulti-
mate fine, however, cannot exceed the legal maximum of ten per cent of the under-
taking’s turnover.60 
The European Commission’s case experience is solid and examples of its fining 
practice are numerous. Interestingly, since the publication of the 1998 Guidelines on 
Fines, the imposed fines have substantially increased. Before those Guidelines, fines 
were substantially lower than the ten per cent turnover ceiling. Since then, however, 
there have been several cases in which the fine calculated on the basis of the Fining 
Guidelines had to be reduced in order not to exceed the legal maximum of ten per 
cent.61 The 2006 Guidelines have produced a second wave of increasingly harsh 
____________ 
56  Point 3 2006 Guidelines on Fines; H. de Broca, The Commission Revises its Guidelines 
for Setting Fines in Antitrust Cases, 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 1 (2006), 1, available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/. 
57  H. de Broca, The Commission Revises its Guidelines for Setting Fines in Antitrust 
Cases, 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 1 (2006), 1, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/publications/cpn/. 
58  Point 3 2006 Guidelines on Fines; H. de Broca, The Commission Revises its Guidelines 
for Setting Fines in Antitrust Cases, 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 1 (2006), 1, available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/. See also N. Kroes, Enforcement of 
Prohibition of Cartels in Europe, opening address, in: C.-D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu 
(eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels, Ox-
ford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2007, (3) 5 (‘I intend to (…) give companies greater predict-
ability as to the level of the fines’.). 
59  Point 3 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines, emphasis added. 
60  For a more in-depth analysis of the sentencing factors set out by the 2006 Guidelines 
on Fines, see V. Franssen, European Sentencing Principles for Corporations, doctoral dis-
sertation, Leuven, KU Leuven, 2013, at 321–324. 
61  See e.g. J.M. Connor, ‘Has the European Commission Become More Severe in Pun-
ishing Cartels? Effects of the 2006 Guidelines’, 32 E.C.L.R. 27 (2011), 31. 
 EU Administrative Criminal Law 13 
fines, but this evolution seems to be primarily due to the value of sales now being 
the starting point for the calculation of the fine.  
–  Other Sanctions and Measures 
Fines are definitely the most prominent type of sanction applied to cartels. Never-
theless, Regulation No 1/2003 also contains a number of other sanctions and 
measures which may be relevant in the context of cartels and thus merit a brief anal-
ysis. 
First, based on Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, the European Commission 
may order an undertaking to bring the established infringement to an end. Article 7 
decisions are referred to as ‘prohibition decisions’ or ‘cease and desist orders’.62 
Such decisions formally find ‘there is an infringement’.63 In practice, prohibition 
decisions are nearly64 always combined with the imposition of a fine, particularly in 
cartel cases, where it is essential to bring the infringement to an end if it has not been 
terminated yet and regardless of whether the fine is imposed on the basis of the leni-
ency or settlement rules.65  
____________ 
62  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 943. 
63  See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-189_en.htm. Interestingly, the 
European Commission is generalizing the finding of an infringement, whereas Article 7(1) 
of Regulation No 1/2003 was less affirmative, leaving this up to the discretion of the Com-
mission (‘If the Commission has a legitimate interest in doing so, it may also find that an 
infringement has been committed in the past’. (emphasis added))  
64  On the basis of a cursory analysis of the decisions taken by the European Commission 
since 2012, the imposition of a fine indeed goes hand in hand with a prohibition decision. A 
rare exception is the re-adoption of the fining decision in the paper envelopes cartel after the 
General Court had annulled the first decision (decision of 16 June 2017; http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39780/39780_3807_3.pdf). But the original 
decision of 10 December 2014 did include a prohibition clause based on Article 7 of Regu-
lation No 1/2003: see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/
39780/39780_3528_6.pdf , at 18. 
65  A prohibition decision was, for instance, taken in the TV and computer monitor tubes 
cartel (decision of 5 December 2012; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust
/cases/dec_docs/39437/39437_6784_3.pdf), the automotive wire harnesses (decision of 10 
July 2013; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39748/
39748_3911_5.pdf ), the North Sea shrimps price-fixing cartel (decision of 27 November 
2013; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39633/39633_2636_9.pdf); 
the high voltage power cables cartel (decision of 2 April 2014; http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39610/39610_9899_5.pdf), the parking heaters cartel (deci-
sion of 17 June 2015; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/anti-
trust/cases/dec_docs/40055/40055_713_11.pdf), the optical disk drivers cartel (decision of 
21 October 2015; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/
dec_docs/39639/39639_3631_8.pdf), the Euro interest rates derivatives cartel (decision of 6 
December 2016; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/
39914/39914_8910_5.pdf), and the braking systems cartel (decision of 21 February 2018; 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39920/39920_738_3.pdf). 
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In order to make sure the undertaking puts an end to the infringement, the Com-
mission, however, also has the possibility to impose ‘behavioural or structural rem-
edies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring 
the infringement effectively to an end’.66 Still, this intrusive power is ‘not to be used 
lightly’.67 In cartel cases, there are hardly any examples of such behavioural or struc-
tural remedies.68 Indeed, in practice, decisions taken on the basis of Article 7(1) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 are nearly always limited to the obligation to terminate the 
infringement and all reiterate the following standard clause:  
Given the secrecy in which the cartel arrangements are usually carried out and the gravity 
of such infringements, it is appropriate for the Commission to require the undertakings to 
which this Decision is addressed to immediately bring the infringement to an end if, they 
should have not already done so, and to refrain from any agreement or concerted practice 
which may have the same or a similar object or effect.69  
The Commission seems very reluctant to adopt actual behavioural or structural 
remedies, at least in the area of cartels,70 leaving it up to the undertakings concerned 
to make the necessary changes to end the infringement and avoid re-offending. 
Second, Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 gives the Commission the option to 
adopt a commitment decision. Like Article 7 decisions, commitment decisions re-
quire the undertakings concerned to terminate the infringement. Nevertheless, com-
mitment decisions differ from prohibition decisions in two respects: they do not for-
mally find that there is an infringement and they require the undertakings to 
voluntarily offer certain commitments that ‘meet the concerns expressed to them by 
the Commission’.71 Such commitment decisions may involve behavioural or struc-
tural obligations. Commitment decisions are obviously based on a more consensual, 
regulatory kind of enforcement and they are only possible when the Commission 
____________ 
66  Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, emphasis added. See also Recital 12 of the Pre-
amble of Regulation No 1/2003. 
67  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 945. 
68  Jones and Sufrin only give one example, a price-fixing cartel between shipping com-
panies, where the Commission imposed behavioural remedies such as the obligation ‘to in-
form customers that they were entitled to renegotiate the terms of contracts concluded within 
the context of the agreement or to terminate them’. Nevertheless, the General Court annulled 
this part of the decision, considering it was beyond what was necessary to end the infringe-
ment. See A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 944, referring to case T-395/94, Atlantic Con-
tainer Line AB [2002]. 
69  See e.g. the braking systems cartel (decision of 21 February 2018; http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39920/39920_738_3.pdf), at 18. 
70  With respect to other infringements of EU competition law, the Commission apparently 
requires more often behavioural or structural remedies, though usually on the basis of a com-
mitment decision (infra). See A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and 
Materials, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 945. 
71  These two characteristics are emphasized by the Commission on its website. See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-189_en.htm. 
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does not intend to impose a fine.72 That being said, if the undertaking does not com-
ply with its commitments, the Commission can still decide to impose a fine, in ac-
cordance with its 2006 Guidelines on Fines. Considering that cartels are ‘among the 
most harmful restrictions of competition’, which need to be punished and deterred 
‘[a]s a matter of policy’,73 it would require a complete policy shift for the European 
Commission to adopt a commitment decision in cartel cases.74 
While limited resources and other practical reasons could explain the Commis-
sion’s reluctance75 to engage in reformative cartel sanctions, it is noteworthy that, in 
other areas of competition law (e.g. with respect to dominant abuse), the Commission 
has adopted commitment decisions76 which clearly aim at reform but, as indicated, 
exclude the possibility of a fine. These commitment decisions may even include 
monitoring to ensure that the undertaking complies with the commitments it agreed 
to. If the undertaking violates the terms of the commitment decision, it can be fined.77 
Therefore, as we have argued elsewhere,78 these commitment decisions are, to some 
extent, comparable to corporate probation. 
Third and finally, the Commission may also impose a periodic penalty payment 
on undertakings to compel them:  
– to end a cartel or another infringement of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU; 
– to comply with interim measures based on Article 8 of Regulation No 1/2003; 
____________ 
72  Recital 13 of the Preamble of Regulation No 1/2003 (‘Commitment decisions are not 
appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine’.). 
73  Point 23 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines. 
74  According to the European Commission’s website, ‘[c]ommitment decisions are not 
appropriate in cases where the Commission considers that the very nature of the infringe-
ment calls for a fine. Consequently, the Commission in particular does not apply the com-
mitment procedure to secret cartels that fall under the Leniency Notice. Furthermore, in cases 
like cartels, there is no commitment possible to solve the competition problem. In such cases, 
an order to stop the practice and/or to pay a fine is the only appropriate outcome’. See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-189_en.htm (last accessed on 11 April 
2019). 
75  It has been argued that undertakings are also ‘not overly enthusiastic about being reha-
bilitated’ and would engage in intensive lobbying to reduce the Commission’s powers to 
adopt reformative sanctions. See I. Simonsson, Legitimacy in EU Cartel Control, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2010, 300, with reference to Parker (2006). 
76  For a recent example, see the decision of 24 May 2018 taken against Gazprom: in the 
case at hand, the Commission suspected Gazprom of abusing its dominant position and im-
posing contractual territorial restrictions. Under this decision Gazprom committed to a vari-
ety of structural modifications. A ‘Monitoring Trustee’ was appointed to ‘enable full and 
effective monitoring of the Commitments’. See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/anti-
trust/cases/dec_docs/39816/39816_10148_3.pdf , at 11 and 28–30.  
77  Article 23(2), para. 1(c) of Regulation No 1/2003. For a further analysis of commit-
ment decisions, see A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materi-
als, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 945–954. 
78  See V. Franssen, European Sentencing Principles for Corporations, doctoral disserta-
tion, Leuven, KU Leuven, 2013, at 275–276 and 334. 
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– to comply with an Article 9 decision; 
– to supply complete and correct information requested by the Commission; or 
– to submit to an inspection.79 
In other words, this penalty payment serves as a stick to make sure the undertaking 
complies with the Commission’s sanctioning decision or investigative measure; 
therefore, they are coercive measures rather than sanctions.80 The amount of the pe-
riod penalty payment shall not exceed five per cent of the average daily turnover in 
the preceding business year. It is calculated from the date indicated in the decision.81 
–  Publication of Fining and Other Decisions of the European Commission 
The Preamble of Regulation No 1/2003 states that the European Commission’s 
decisions, including its fining decisions, ‘should be widely publicised’.82 Pursuant to 
Article 30 of Regulation No 1/2003, the Commission’s decisions based on Articles 
7 to 10 and 23 to 24 shall all be published. This encompasses all sanctions and deci-
sions discussed above. According to paragraph 2, ‘[t]he publication shall state the 
names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties 
imposed’. Contrary to what we will see when analysing EU banking law (infra, Part 
II, C.), there is no possibility to refrain from publication or to anonymize the publi-
cation. The only possible limitation relates to the protection of business secrets. 
As a result, all fining decisions of the Commission are published on its website, in 
a non-confidential version, in addition to a summary of the decision which is pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the European Union. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the non-confidential versions cannot reveal any business secrets of the cartel partic-
ipants, these public versions of the decisions are sometimes very extensive and 
highly detailed, also containing a lot of information about the calculation of the fines. 
As we will see, this is far from being the case in the field of EU banking law, where 
the European Central Bank only published very brief summaries of its decisions 
providing hardly any transparency about the sanctioning process (infra, Part II, C.2.). 
____________ 
79  Article 24(1) of Regulation No 1/2003. 
80  Sanctions are imposed because the person in question has committed an offence; they 
can be punitive (in which case we use the term ‘criminal sanctions’) or (purely) preventive. 
The term ‘sanctions’ is thus a general, overarching term that refers to all consequences an 
offender faces as a result of a (criminal) offence or (civil or administrative) infringement and 
that may encompass various kinds of intermediate or hybrid sanctions. By contrast, measures 
are purely preventive responses to (potentially) dangerous persons or situations. They do not 
necessarily have a link with an offence or infringement and can be imposed in personam or 
in rem. For a further analysis of the difference between the terms ‘sanctions’ and ‘measures’, 
see V. Franssen, European Sentencing Principles for Corporations, doctoral dissertation, 
Leuven, KU Leuven, 2013, at 151–152.  
81  Article 24(1) of Regulation No 1/2003. 
82  Recital 32 of the Preamble of Regulation No 1/2003. 
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Moreover, the Commission’s decisions are promptly accompanied by a press re-
lease83—press releases which are characterized by a ‘tough-on-crime’ language, 
even if there are definitely some differences in style between the successive compe-
tent Commissioners.84 As such, the publication policy clearly contributes to the sanc-
tioning goals of the Commission, namely deterrence and, to some extent, also retri-
bution (infra, Part III, B.2.).   
C.  EU Banking Law  
1.  Introduction 
It is no secret that EU banking law is a quite complex field of law. This has to do 
with the legal and institutional structure of the European Banking Union and its scope 
of application. Therefore, it seems appropriate to first give a brief general presenta-
tion of the structure of the European Banking Union and the applicable legal frame-
work before turning to the (supervisory and) sanctioning powers of the competent 
authorities.85  
Put simply, the European Banking Union was created in response to the Euro cri-
sis, which was one of the consequences of the global financial crisis in 2008, ‘to 
____________ 
83  All the Commission’s decisions and press releases in cartel cases are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
84  Ms Kroes’ language was clearly tougher than the language of her successor, Mr Al-
munia, even though he too referred to the ‘fight on cartels’. (J. Almunia, quoted in: European 
Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines 17 bathroom equipment manufacturers €622 mil-
lion in price fixing cartel, press release, 23 June 2010.) Ms Kroes would, for instance, say 
the following with respect to the producers of sodium chlorate paper bleach: ‘These compa-
nies have to learn the hard way that the Commission will impose high fines when they rip 
off their customers, and ultimately consumers, by forming a cartel’. (N. Kroes, quoted in: 
European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines sodium chlorate paper bleach produc-
ers €79 million for market sharing and price fixing cartel, press release, 11 June 2008, em-
phasis added.) Under the current Commissioner, Ms Vestager, the Commission’s language 
seems to have softened—even if the same can definitely not be said about the amounts of 
the fines that have been imposed in recent years. Ms Vestager focuses more on the harm 
caused to consumers than the adverse impact on the competitiveness of an economic sector. 
See e.g. M. Vestager, quoted in: European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines mari-
time car carriers and car parts suppliers a total of €546 million in three separate cartel 
settlements, press release, 21 February 2018: ‘The three separate decisions taken today show 
that we will not tolerate anticompetitive behaviour affecting European consumers and in-
dustries. By raising component prices or transport costs for cars, the cartels ultimately hurt 
European consumers and adversely impacted the competitiveness of the European automo-
tive sector, which employs around 12 million people in the EU’ (emphasis added). 
85  For a more comprehensive presentation, see S. Allegrezza and O. Voordeckers, ‘Inves-
tigative and Sanctioning Powers of the ECB in the Framework of the Single Monetary Mech-
anism, Mapping the Complexity of a New Enforcement Model’, 4 eucrim 151 (2015), at 
151–154. 
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prevent a future banking crisis putting the whole currency union at risk’.86 It is com-
posed of two elements: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (hereinafter: SSM) and 
the Single Resolution Mechanism (hereinafter: SRM)87.  
The SSM is the new system of banking supervision, bringing credit institutions, 
financial holding companies, and mixed financial holding companies incorporated 
in participating states (hereinafter: supervised entities) under the direct or indirect 
control of the European Central Bank (hereinafter: ECB).88 Within the SSM, the pru-
dential supervision of such entities is shared with the national supervisory authorities 
of participating states (hereinafter: National Competent Authorities or NCAs).89  
Next to that, the SRM is concerned with the recovery and the resolution of the 
same supervised entities, or, put differently, it aims to ensure the efficient resolution 
of failing banks, resolution meaning the restructuring of a failing bank by a resolution 
authority. To this end, the supervised entities are brought under the scrutiny of the 
Single Resolution Board (hereinafter: SRB). The SRM also comprises the national 
resolution authorities of the participating states (hereinafter: National Resolution Au-
thorities or NRAs). 
The SSM90 is based on Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 
201391 (hereinafter: SSM Regulation), which confers far-reaching tasks and powers 
on the ECB to supervise credit institutions and other supervised entities incorporated 
in participating states.92 The SSM also covers banks that are not located in the Euro 
____________ 
86  M. Meister, ‘The European Banking Union’, 2 E.C.F.R. 115 (2015), at 116. For a 
broader analysis of the EU’s responses to the Euro crisis, see B. De Witte, ‘Euro Crisis 
Responses and the EU Legal Order: Increased Institutional Variation or Constitutional Mu-
tation’, 11 EuConst 434 (2015).  
87  Fact Sheets on the European Union: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/
en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.6.5.html.  
88  Ch. V. Gortsos, ‘The power of the ECB to impose administrative penalties as a super-
visory authority: an analysis of Article 18 of the SSM Regulation’, ECEFIL Working Pa-
pers, No 2015/11, p. 11; C. Brescia Morra, ‘From the Single Supervisory Mechanism to the 
Banking Union. The role of the ECB and the EBA’, Working Paper No 2, Luiss Guido Carli 
School of European Polical Economy, Luiss University Press, Italy, 2014, at 2–3.  
89  For a more detailed presentation of the SSM, see ECB, SSM Supervisory Manual. Eu-
ropean banking supervision: functioning of the SSM and supervisory approach, March 2018, 
available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.supervisoryman-
ual201803.en.pdf?1584b27046baf1e68f92f82caadb3a63 (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
90  The SSM was established in October 2013 and became operational as from 4 Novem-
ber 2014.  
91  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on 
the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions, OJ L 287, 29 October 2013, at 63. 
92  For a critical analysis of the SSM and the ECB’s supervisory tasks, see e.g. K. Alex-
ander, ‘The European Central Bank and Banking Supervision: The Regulatory Limits of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism’, 3 E.C.F.R. 467 (2016), at 467–494. See also M. Goldmann, 
‘United in Diversity? The Relationship between Monetary Policy and Prudential Supervi-
sion in the Banking Union’, 14 EuConst 283 (2018). 
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area but for which the state of incorporation has opted in.93 On 16 April 2014, the 
ECB adopted Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 establishing the framework for cooper-
ation within the SSM between the ECB and the NCAs94 (hereinafter: SSM Frame-
work Regulation). 
When it comes to the SRM, the main legal source is Regulation No 806/2014 of 
15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of the SRM95 (hereinafter: 
SRM Regulation).96 The SRM97 is directly responsible for the resolution of credit 
institutions under direct supervision of the ECB. The SRB being a resolution author-
ity, most of its distinctive powers are ones that would be exercised during a resolu-
tion itself. However, the SRB does have certain powers that it can exercise inde-
pendently of a resolution action and which are very similar to the sanctioning powers 
of the ECB. These powers are of particular interest for our analysis. 
Within the European Banking Union, both the ECB and the SRB are given signif-
icant powers—including sanctioning powers—to deal with the supervision and the 
resolution of supervised entities respectively. This transfer of the supervision of 
banks to the EU level was considered necessary to avoid widespread financial crises, 
like the one experienced in 2008, in the future.98 Thus, contrary to the decentraliza-
tion evolution witnessed in the area of EU competition law (supra, Part II, B.2.), the 
European Banking Union essentially consists of a centralization of supervision at the 
____________ 
93  Fact Sheets on the European Union: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/
en/displayFtu.html? ftuId=FTU_2.6.5.html; C. Brescia Morra, ‘From the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism to the Banking Union. The role of the ECB and the EBA’, Working Paper No 2, 
Luiss Guido Carli School of European Polical Economy, Luiss University Press, Italy, 2014, 
at 5.  
94  Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 estab-
lishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between 
the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated 
authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17), OJ L 141, 14 May 2014, at 1. 
95  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mecha-
nism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L 225, 
30 July 2014, at 1. 
96  Ch. V. Gortsos, The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF), A comprehensive review of the second main pillar of the European Banking 
Union, ECEFIL, 2015. 
97  The SRM entered into force on 19 August 2014.  
98  Communication from the Commission of the European Parliament and the Council, A 
Roadmap towards a Banking Union, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 510 final, 
at 3; L. Wissink, T. Duijkersloot, and R. Widdershoven, ‘Shifts in Competences between 
Member States and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and their 
Consequences for Judicial Protection’, 10 Utrecht Law Review 92 (2014); B. Reisenhofer 
and D. Jaros, ‘Completing the Banking Union’, European Law Blog, 22 April 2014, 
http://europeanlawblog.eu/2014/04/22/completing-the-banking-union/ (last accessed on 19 
March 2019). 
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EU level. Another difference with EU competition law is that the ECB will some-
times apply national law (in particular, national law implementing EU directives or 
taking options that EU regulations left to the Member States); this is considered to 
be a novelty in EU law.99 Yet this ‘new mode of European integration’ is by no means 
limited to the field of EU banking law: for instance, the future European Public Pros-
ecutor will also apply national law in many respects, including national criminal pro-
cedure, which has hardly been approximated by EU law. 
In the following we will provide an overview of the various sanctioning powers of 
the ECB and the SRB. 
2.  The Sanctioning Powers of the ECB  
The supervision of banks by the ECB is effective provided that the ECB is also 
able to sanction breaches of prudential requirements. Therefore, the SSM Regulation 
sets out extensive sanctioning powers for the ECB to compel supervised entities to 
comply with EU banking law in general as well as with the supervisory decisions 
and regulations of the ECB. The ECB has thus been equipped with a ‘toolbox’ con-
taining powers to conduct investigative measures (such as the power to require the 
submission and examination of documents, books, and records,100 or to conduct nec-
essary on-site inspections at the business premises of supervised entities101), to adopt 
administrative measures (such as the power to require supervised entities to hold own 
funds in excess of the capital requirements imposed on them102 or to impose addi-
tional or more frequent reporting requirements103 and specific liquidity require-
ments104) and to impose administrative penalties (such as the power to impose fines 
or periodic penalty payments to supervised entities in case of certain infringe-
ments).105 In what follows, we will primarily focus on the imposition of administra-
tive penalties by the ECB and the SRB when exercising their sanctioning powers. 
For the purpose of effectively carrying out its supervisory tasks, the ECB has both 
direct and indirect sanctioning powers.  
____________ 
99  For a further analysis, see L. Boucon and D. Jaros, ‘The Application of National Law 
by the European Central Bank within the Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism: 
A New Mode of European Integration?’, 10 Eur. J. Legal Stud. 155 (2018) (special issue), 
at 165 et seq. 
100  Article 11(1) of the SSM Regulation. 
101  Article 12 of the SSM Regulation. 
102  Article 16(2)(a) of the SSM Regulation. 
103  Article 16(2)(j) of the SSM Regulation. 
104  Article 16(2)(k) of the SSM Regulation. 
105  S. Allegrezza and O. Voordeckers, ‘Investigative and Sanctioning Powers of the ECB 
in the Framework of the Single Monetary Mechanism, Mapping the Complexity of a New 
Enforcement Model’, 4 eucrim 151 (2015), at 153. 
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Under its direct sanctioning powers, the ECB can opt for a variety of administra-
tive sanctions, including administrative pecuniary penalties, fines, and periodic pen-
alty payments. The main legal sources for administrative sanctions are Article 18 of 
the SSM Regulation and Article 120 of the SSM Framework Regulation,106 which 
provide for two types of administrative sanctions that could be imposed by the ECB, 
namely (i) ‘administrative pecuniary penalties provided for and imposed under Arti-
cle 18(1) of the SSM Regulation’107 and (ii) ‘fines and periodic penalty payments 
provided for in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 and imposed under Arti-
cle 18(7) of the SSM Regulation’.108 These types of sanctions differ as to their scope 
of application and the level of penalty imposed, as will be explained below. 
By indirect sanctioning powers, we refer to the possibility of the ECB to give 
instructions to the NCAs (Art. 6(5)(a) and 9(1), para. 3 SSM Regulation). However, 
these indirect sanctioning powers will not analysed further here as this would be 
beyond the scope of this contribution.109 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that while the ECB has no power to impose criminal 
sanctions, it does have the possibility to report criminal offences to the competent 
national authorities. Article 136 of the SSM Framework Regulation provides that the 
ECB, when it has reasons to suspect that a criminal offence may have been commit-
ted, shall request the relevant NCA to refer the matter to the appropriate authorities 
for investigation and possibly criminal prosecution, in accordance with criminal law. 
In what follows, we will take a closer look at the administrative sanctions the ECB 
can resort to and their material and personal scope of application. 
–  Administrative Pecuniary Penalties 
Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation provides that the ECB is given the power to 
impose administrative pecuniary penalties upon credit institutions and other super-
vised entities which committed—intentionally or negligently—a breach of relevant 
directly applicable acts of EU law for which such administrative penalties are made 
available. 
●  Scope of Application 
The conditions for imposing administrative pecuniary penalties set out in Arti-
cle 18(1) of the SSM Regulation are twofold: first, the entity committing the breach 
____________ 
106  Ch. V. Gortsos, ‘The power of the ECB to impose administrative penalties as a super-
visory authority: an analysis of Article 18 of the SSM Regulation’, ECEFIL Working Pa-
pers, No 2015/11, at 9 and 10. 
107  Article 120 (a) of the SSM Framework Regulation.  
108  Article 120 (b) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
109  See L. Boucon and D. Jaros, ‘The Application of National Law by the European Cen-
tral Bank within the Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism: A New Mode of Eu-
ropean Integration?’, 10 Eur. J. Legal Stud. 155 (2018) (special issue), at 165–166 and 179–
182. 
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should be a significant entity and second, the significant entity should have breached 
‘a requirement under relevant directly applicable acts of Union law’.110 
As to the first condition, Article 18(1) provides that the ECB is competent to di-
rectly sanction ‘credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial 
holding companies’. There is some discussion among scholars as to whether Arti-
cle 18(1) only applies to significant supervised entities or includes less significant 
institutions as well.111 In our view, the application of this provision to significant 
entities only may be deduced from Recital 53 of the Preamble of the SSM Regulation 
as well as Articles 124 and 134 of the SSM Framework Regulation. On the one hand, 
Recital 53 clearly states that:  
[n]othing in this Regulation should be understood as conferring on the ECB the power to 
impose penalties on natural or legal persons other than credit institutions, financial hold-
ing companies or mixed financial holding companies (…). 
On the other hand, Article 124 of the SSM Regulation provides for a duty to refer 
alleged breaches to the investigation unit and only refers to infringements committed 
by significant supervised entities, while Article 134 of the same Regulation explic-
itly provides that significant supervised entities fall under the direct supervision of 
the ECB.112 This interpretation also seems to be confirmed by the ECB’s Supervisory 
Manual.113 
The second condition imposed by Article 18(1) is that the significant entity should 
have breached ‘a requirement under relevant directly applicable acts of Union 
____________ 
110  L. Wissink, T. Duijkersloot, and R. Widdershoven, ‘Shifts in Competences between 
Member States and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and their 
Consequences for Judicial Protection’, 10 Utrecht Law Review 92 (2014), at 102–103.  
111  S. Allegrezza and O. Voordeckers, ‘Investigative and Sanctioning Powers of the ECB 
in the Framework of the Single Monetary Mechanism, Mapping the Complexity of a New 
Enforcement Model’, 4 eucrim 151 (2015),  at 156; S. Allegrezza and I. Rodopoulos, ‘En-
forcing Prudential Banking Regulations in the Eurozone: A Reading from the Viewpoint of 
Criminal Law’, in: K. Ligeti and V. Franssen (eds.), Challenges in the Field of Economic 
and Financial Crime in Europe and the US, Oxford/Portland, Hart, 2017, at 239; S. 
Loosveld, ‘The ECB’s Investigatory and Sanctioning Powers under the Future Single Su-
pervisory Mechanism’, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation (2013), at 423.  
112  For a list of the banks directly supervised by the ECB on 1 March 2019, see 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.listofsupervisedenti-
ties20190301.en.pdf. On 4 March, another bank was added to the list: ECB, ECB takes over 
direct supervision of AS PNB Banka in Latvia, press release, available at: https://www.bank-
ingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ssm.pr190311~24201e56e0.en.html (last 
accessed 18 April 2019). 
113  European Central Bank, SSM Supervisory Manual. European banking supervision: 
functioning of the SSM and supervisory approach, March 2018, at 102, available at: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.supervisorymanual201803.
en.pdf?1584b27046baf1e68f92f82caadb3a63 (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
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law’.114 This covers infringements of directly applicable provisions of EU banking 
law, such as the Capital Requirements Regulation.115  
●  Level of Penalty 
Pursuant to Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation, administrative pecuniary penal-
ties that may be imposed by the ECB are the following: 
– up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach 
where those could be determined; 
– up to ten per cent of the total annual turnover116 of the concerned supervised entity 
in the preceding business year; and 
– other pecuniary penalties as provided for under EU banking law. 
Moreover, the penalties applied shall be effective, proportionate, and dissua-
sive.117  
On the basis of the above criteria the ECB clearly enjoys a wide fining discretion. 
Unlike the European Commission in the area of EU competition law (supra, Part II, 
B.2.), the ECB has not published any guidelines to provide transparency about its 
fining practice. This should not surprise considering the interplay between banking 
supervision and monetary policy,118 and the sometimes delicate, even political nature 
of its fining decisions. 
●  Some Case Examples 
As explained earlier, the Banking Union and the sanctioning powers of the ECB 
were created only a few years ago. Compared to EU competition law, where the EU 
institutions acquired a lot of practical experience over the last decades, case exam-
ples remain quite limited in the field of EU banking law. Between August 2017 and 
the time of finalizing this report,119 seven relevant decisions have been published on 
the ECB’s website in accordance with Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation.120 It is 
noteworthy that most decisions (six out of seven) were adopted very recently, i.e. 
between March 2018 and February 2019. This recent increase clearly illustrates the 
____________ 
114  Emphasis added. 
115  See Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirement for credit institutions 
and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27 June 2013, 
at 1. For an example, see https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/
2017/html/ssm.pr170915.en.html (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
116  As defined under Article 128 of the SSM Framework Regulation.  
117  Article 18(3) of the SSM Regulation. 
118  For a further analysis of this interplay, see M. Goldmann, ‘United in Diversity? The 
Relationship between Monetary Policy and Prudential Supervision in the Banking Union’, 
14 EuConst 283 (2018). 
119  This report was finalized in April 2019. 
120  For an overview of the ECB’s supervisory sanctions, see https://www.bankingsuper-
vision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/html/index.en.html (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
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new tendency of the ECB to fully exercise its sanctioning powers towards the entities 
it supervises. 
On 24 August 2017,121 the ECB imposed its first administrative pecuniary penalty 
under Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation upon the Italian bank, Banco Popolare di 
Vicenza S.p.A., for breaching reporting and public disclosure requirements and for 
breaching the large exposures limit laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013122 
and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014.123 The ECB imposed 
two penalties, which amounted to a total of €11.2 million. The full decision is not 
public; the ECB only publishes the ‘main elements of the decision’ on its website. 
As regards the calculation of the fines, the press release only states that ‘the penalties 
imposed take into account the severity of the breaches and the degree of responsibil-
ity of the entity’.124 
From March 2018 until February 2019, the ECB imposed six administrative pecu-
niary penalties pursuant to Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation upon six different 
supervised entities for a total amount of €7 million: 
– on 14 March 2018, Banco Sabadell S.A.125 was sanctioned with an administrative 
pecuniary penalty of €1.6 million for a continuous breach of the own funds re-
quirement laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013126 and Regulation (EU) 
No 241/2014.127 The justification for the amount of the penalty imposed is hardly 
existent: the ECB public summary of the decision only states that ‘this penalty is 
____________ 
121  ECB, ECB sanctions Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. in L.C.A. for breaching su-
pervisory requirements between 2014 and 2016, press release, 15 September 2017, available 
at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ssm.
pr170915.en.html (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
122  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
123  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 of 16 April 2014 laying 
down implementing technical standards with regard to supervisory reporting of institutions 
according to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
OJ L 191, 28 June 2014, at 1.  
124  ECB, ECB sanctions Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. in L.C.A. for breaching su-
pervisory requirements between 2014 and 2016, press release, 15 September 2017, available 
at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ssm.pr
170915.en.html (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
125  ECB, ECB sanctions Banco de Sabadell, S.A., press release, 8 May 2018, available at: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ssm.pr180508.en.html 
(last accessed 17 April 2019). 
126  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.  
127  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 241/2014 of 7 January 2014 supplement-
ing Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard 
to regulatory technical standards for Own Funds requirements for institutions.  
 EU Administrative Criminal Law 25 
imposed in respect of a continuous breach of [the legal obligations under the fore-
going regulations] without the permission of the competent authority’;128  
– on 16 July 2018, CA Consumer Finance,129 Crédit Agricole S.A., and Crédit 
Agricole Corporate130 and Investment Bank131 were sanctioned to pay an admin-
istrative pecuniary penalty in an amount of €200,000, €4.3 million, and €300,000 
respectively for a breach of the own funds requirement laid down in Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013132. According to the ECB’s public summary of the decision, 
the amount of the penalty reflects the duration of the breach (in all three cases), 
the degree of responsibility of the supervised entity (in the case of CA Consumer 
Finance133 and Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank134), and/or the fact 
that the supervised entity ‘continued classifying the instruments without the nec-
essary permissions’ (in the case of Crédit Agricole S.A.135); 
– and finally, on 15 February 2019, Sberbank Europe AG136 was sanctioned to pay 
an administrative pecuniary penalty in an amount of €630,000 for a breach of the 
large exposure requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013137. The 
ECB explains the amount of the penalty as follows:  
____________ 
128  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
180508_publication_template.en.pdf (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
129  ECB, ECB sanctions CA Consumer Finance for breaching the procedure for classify-
ing capital in 2016, press release, 20 August 2018, available at: https://www.bankingsuper-
vision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ssm.pr180820_2.en.html (last accessed 17 April 
2019). 
130  ECB, ECB sanctions Crédit Agricole, S.A. for breaching the procedure for classifying 
capital between 2015 and 2016, press release, 20 August 2018, available at: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ssm.pr180820.en.html 
(last accessed 17 April 2019). 
131  ECB, ECB sanctions Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank for breaching 
the procedure for classifying capital between 2015 and 2016, press release, 20 August 2018, 
available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/
ssm.pr180820_1.en.html (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
132  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27 June 2013, at 1.  
133  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
180820_2_publication_template.en.pdf (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
134  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
180820_1_publication_template.en.pdf (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
135  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
180820_publication_template.en.pdf (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
136  ECB, ECB sanctions Sberbank Europe AG for breaching large exposure limits in 
2015, press release, 25 February 2019, available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.eu-
ropa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ssm.pr190225~463a5a728e.en.html (last accessed 17 April 
2019). 
137  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.  
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Among other circumstances, the amount of the penalty takes into account that the large 
exposure limit was exceeded on an individual as well as on a consolidated basis, the du-
ration of the breaches and the level of excess over the large exposure limit.138 
In addition to the very limited public information justifying the amount of the im-
posed penalties, it is noteworthy that the ECB’s press releases are often published 
with some delay. More importantly, there is an astonishing difference in style be-
tween these very concise and ‘dry’ press releases and the harsh, deterring, and even 
condemning tone of the European Commission’s press releases in the field of EU 
competition law (supra, Part II,B.2.).  
–  Fines and Periodic Penalty Payments 
Next to the administrative pecuniary penalties discussed above, Article 18(7) of 
the SSM Regulation provides that the ECB may also impose ‘sanctions’ in accord-
ance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning 
the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (hereinafter: Regula-
tion No 2532/98),139 in case of a breach of ECB regulations or decisions. Arti-
cle 120(b) of the SSM Framework Regulation, referring to 2(1) of Regulation 
No 2532/98, determines which sanctions can be imposed on the basis of Art. 18(7) 
of the SSM Regulation: fines and periodic penalty payments. 
Fines are defined as ‘a single amount of money which an undertaking is obliged 
to pay as a sanction’,140 and thus in essence strongly resemble the above administra-
tive pecuniary penalties, despite the different scope of application, as will be ex-
plained below. Periodic penalty payments are, by contrast, ‘amounts of money 
which, in the case of continued infringement, an undertaking is obliged to pay either 
as a punishment, or with a view to forcing the entities concerned to comply with the 
ECB supervisory regulations and decisions’.141 
●  Scope of Application 
The scope of application of fines and periodic penalty payments is largely identi-
cal. Article 1a(1) of Regulation No 2532/98 lays down two conditions that must be 
fulfilled. 
First, as for the personal scope of application, the ECB is competent to impose 
such penalties on ‘undertakings’, which are defined as: 
____________ 
138  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
20190220_publication_template.en.pdf (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
139  Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to 
impose sanctions, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 2015/159 of 27 January 2015, 
OJ L 318, 27 November 1998, 4.  
140  Article 1(5) of Regulation No 2532/98.   
141  Article 1(6) of Regulation No 2532/98, emphasis added.  
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those natural or legal persons, private or public (…) in a participating Member State which 
are the subject of obligations arising from ECB regulations and decisions (…).142  
One will immediately note that this term has a more specific meaning in the field 
of EU banking law than in EU competition law (supra, Part II, B.2.).  
Although this definition may create the impression that natural persons fall within 
the scope of application of fines and periodic pecuniary penalties to be imposed un-
der Article 18(7) of the SSM Regulation, this is not the case. Recital 53 of the Pre-
amble of the SSM Regulation indeed clearly states that:  
[n]othing in this Regulation should be understood as conferring on the ECB the power to 
impose penalties on natural or legal persons other than credit institutions, financial hold-
ing companies or mixed financial holding companies (…). 
The meaning of the term ‘undertakings’ is further defined by Article 122 of the 
SSM Framework Regulation. Contrary to administrative pecuniary penalties (supra), 
fines and periodic penalty payments may be imposed on both significant and less 
significant supervised entities.143 As to the latter, such penalties are to be imposed 
‘only if the relevant ECB regulations or decisions impose obligations on such less 
significant entities vis-à-vis the ECB’.144 The latter case is thus the only scenario 
where the ECB is entitled to directly impose administrative penalties on a less sig-
nificant entity. 
Second, as regards the material scope of application, fines and periodic penalty 
payments may be imposed in case of a failure to comply with obligations arising 
from ‘ECB regulations or decisions’.145 This is different from administrative pecu-
niary penalties, which are to be imposed in case of failures to comply with EU bank-
ing legislations (supra). 
●  Level of Penalty 
While the administrative sanctions provided for by Regulation No 2532/98 apply 
to all infringements of ECB decisions or regulations, it should be stressed that the 
upper limits of the fines and periodic penalty payments are different when those 
sanctions are imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks.146 Contrary 
to the generally applicable upper limits which consist of lump sums (€500,000 for 
fines and €10,000 per day of infringement when it comes to the periodic penalty 
____________ 
142  Article 1(3) of Regulation No 2532/98. 
143  Article 122 of the SSM Framework Regulation. See also S. Allegrezza and I. 
Rodopoulos, ‘Enforcing Prudential Banking Regulations in the Eurozone: A Reading from 
the Viewpoint of Criminal Law’, in: K. Ligeti and V. Franssen (eds.), Challenges in the 
Field of Economic and Financial Crime in Europe and the US, Oxford/Portland, Hart, 2017, 
at 239. 
144  Article 122(b) of the SSM Framework Regulation. 
145  Article 1a(1) of Regulation No 2532/98. 
146  Article 4a of Regulation No 2532/98 derogates from the general upper limits set by 
Article 2(1) of the same Regulation.  
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payments)147, these specific upper limits are more flexible and take into account the 
undertaking’s ability to pay. 
The upper limit applicable to fines is identical to the one applicable to administra-
tive pecuniary penalties imposed under Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation (supra): 
the maximum fine is twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided by the 
infringement, to the extent that the profits or losses can be determined, or ten per 
cent of the total annual turnover of the undertaking concerned.148 Apart from the 
terminology and the material scope of application, fines are thus essentially the same 
as administrative pecuniary penalties.  
As to periodic pecuniary payments, they shall be ‘calculated for each complete 
day of continued infringement’.149 The supervised entity may be sanctioned to pay a 
daily amount of up to five per cent of its average daily turnover. This maximum is 
identical to the one applicable in EU competition law (supra, Part II, B.2.). Never-
theless, the periodic pecuniary payment may only be imposed by the ECB during a 
maximum period of six months, starting from the date indicated in the ECB’s sanc-
tioning decision.150  
Pursuant to Article 18(3) of the SSM Regulation, all administrative penalties im-
posed by the ECB should also be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.151 In addi-
tion to that, Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2532/98 identifies a number of circum-
stances that the ECB must take into account when imposing a sanction:  
– the degree of culpability of the undertaking (good faith or wilful deceit); 
– the degree of diligence and cooperation of the undertaking with the ECB; 
– the seriousness of the effects of the infringement; 
– the profits obtained by the undertaking thanks to the infringement; 
– the economic size of the undertaking; and  
– if applicable, the sanctions previously imposed by other authorities on the same 
undertaking and based on the same facts. 
Some of these elements are also reflected in the upper limits discussed above (prof-
its, economic size), others substantiate the application of the principle of proportion-
ality (seriousness of effects, duration/frequency) or express the principle of culpabil-
ity (good faith or deceit, cooperation). Interestingly, the last element suggests that, 
rather than applying the ne bis in idem principle as set forth by Article 50 of the EU 
____________ 
147  Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2532/98. 
148  Article 4a(1)(a) of Regulation No 2532/98. 
149  Article 1(6) of Regulation No 2532/98. 
150  Article 129(3) of the SSM Framework Regulation and Article 4a(1)(b) of Regulation 
No 2532/98. 
151  The importance of the proportionality principle is also emphasized by Article 2(2) of 
Regulation No 2532/98, with respect to both the decision to impose a sanction and the deci-
sion on the appropriate (type and level of the) sanction. 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: EU Charter), the principle of propor-
tionality is favoured.  
–  Some Case Examples 
Case examples of the above administrative fines are even rarer than the sanction-
ing decisions holding an administrative pecuniary penalty (supra). As far as we can 
tell, periodic pecuniary payments have not yet been imposed at all.152  
According to the information provided on its website, the ECB issued its first ad-
ministrative penalty under Article 18(7) of the SSM Regulation on 13 July 2017.153 
In the case at hand, the ECB imposed a total fine of €2.5 million upon the Irish bank 
Permanent tsb Group Holdings plc for infringements of ECB decisions imposing 
liquidity requirements.154 Neither the summary version of the ECB’s decision nor 
the press release explains how the amount of the penalty was determined. The press 
release, however, does mention that the infringement ‘did not change the liquidity 
position’ of the bank and adds that the bank has, in the meantime, ‘fully remediated 
the issue’,155 thereby clearly wanting to reassure the financial market. 
More than a year later, on 21 December 2018, the ECB imposed for the second 
time administrative penalties on the basis of Article 18(7) of Regulation No 2532/98. 
A closer look reveals that it is actually a mixed case consisting of two sanctioning 
decisions pursuant to Article 18(7) and one based on both Article 18(1) and Arti-
cle 18(7). In this instance, Novo Banco SA was fined for a total amount of €610,000 
for the infringement of prior decisions of the ECB consisting in the failure to comply 
with large exposure156 and capital requirements,157 and for not complying with EU 
regulations holding reporting requirements.158 The amount of the various penalties 
imposed was justified on the basis of the following elements: the degree of respon-
____________ 
152  In fact, the summary publications of the ECB’s decisions on the basis of Article 18(7) 
of Regulation No 2532/98 only refer to ‘administrative penalties’, without distinguishing 
between fines and periodic penalty payments. Nevertheless, none of the decisions adopted 
so far refers to a daily amount to be paid for a certain period of time. That is why we conclude 
that periodic penalty payments have not yet been imposed. 
153  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
170828_publication_template.en.pdf (last accessed 18 April 2019).  
154  In particular, the ECB’s Decisions of 20 February 2015 and of 20 November 2015 
both imposing specific liquidity requirements. 
155  ECB, ECB sanctions Permanent tsb Group Holdings plc, press release, 28 August 
2017, available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/
ssm.pr170828_1.en.html (last accessed 18 April 2019). 
156  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
20181221_publication_template.en.pdf (last accessed 18 April 2019). 
157  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
20181221_publication_template_1.en.pdf (last accessed 18 April 2019). 
158  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
20181221_publication_template_2.en.pdf (last accessed 18 April 2019). 
30 Franssen/Vandeweerd  
sibility of the bank, the duration of the breach, the seriousness of the breach (devia-
tion from the capital requirement imposed and level of excess over the large exposure 
limit), the fact that ‘the large exposure requirements were not complied with on an 
individual and a consolidated basis’, and ‘the specific circumstances of the restruc-
turing process connected to the creation of Novo Banco, SA’—the latter element 
apparently functions as a mitigating circumstance.159 While a summary version of 
the triple decision with regard to Novo Banco SA was published on the ECB’s web-
site, the ECB seems to have forgotten to send out a press release—it is hard to imag-
ine DG Competition would ever forget to do so when fining cartel participants (su-
pra).  
–  Publication of the Sanctioning Decision 
Pursuant to Article 18(6) of the SSM Regulation and Article 132(1) of the SSM 
Framework Regulation, the ECB shall publish, ‘without undue delay, and after the 
decision has been notified to the supervised entity concerned’, on its website its de-
cisions regarding administrative penalties imposed under Article 18(1) and (7) of the 
SSM Regulation, ‘including information on the type and nature of the breach and the 
identity of the supervised entity concerned’.160 Such information should remain pub-
lished on the ECB’s website for at least five years.161 The same requirement is pro-
vided for by Article 1a(3) of Regulation No 2532/98, but then specifically with re-
spect to fines and periodic penalty payments. 
However, decisions regarding administrative penalties could be published on an 
anonymized basis in case the publication could either: 
– ‘jeopardise the stability of the financial markets or an on-going criminal investi-
gation’;162 or  
– ‘cause, insofar as it can be determined, disproportionate damage to the supervised 
entity concerned’.163 
As mentioned above, for the first time in the summer of 2017 and increasingly 
between March 2018 and February 2019, the ECB published on its website the pen-
alties (and the amounts) it imposed. In each of those cases, the identity of these banks 
and their infringements are explicitly mentioned on the website of the ECB for at 
____________ 
159  See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.
20181221_publication_template.en.pdf (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
160  Article 132(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. See also Ch. V. Gortsos, ‘The 
power of the ECB to impose administrative penalties as a supervisory authority: an analysis 
of Article 18 of the SSM Regulation’, ECEFIL Working Papers, No 2015/11, at 24–25.  
161  Article 132(3) of the SSM Framework Regulation.  
162  Article 132(1)(a) of the SSM Framework Regulation. See also Article 1a(3), para. 2 
Regulation No 2532/98. 
163  Article 132(1)(b) of the SSM Framework Regulation. See also Article 1a(3), para. 2 
Regulation No 2532/98. 
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least the next five years. Yet, there is a clear difference in style with the publication 
of sanctioning decisions under EU competition law. 
3.  The Sanctioning Powers of the SRB 
After having analysed the sanctioning powers of the ECB, it is time to turn to those 
of the SRB. As explained above, the main purpose of the SRM is to ensure the effi-
cient resolution of failing banks. Resolution means the restructuring of a failing bank 
by a resolution authority, in this case the SRB. 
The scope of application of the SRB’s enforcement powers is aligned to the super-
vision of credit institutions by the ECB. This means that the SRB is responsible for 
the resolution of banks directly supervised by the ECB, as opposed to NRAs, which 
are responsible for the remaining banks.164 
As a resolution authority, most of the SRB’s distinctive powers are ones that would 
be exercised during a resolution itself.165 However, the SRB does have investigatory 
powers (such as the power to request information,166 to require the submission of 
documents,167 to obtain oral or written explanations,168 or to conduct on-site inspec-
tions169) as well as sanctioning powers (such as the power to impose fines170 or peri-
odic penalty payments171) that it can exercise independently of a resolution action 
and that are very similar to those conferred on the ECB (supra, Part II, C.2.). Ac-
cording to Article 41(2) of the SRM Regulation, both types of penalties are admin-
istrative in nature. 
–  Fines 
●  Scope of Application 
____________ 
164  J.-P. Servais, ‘Les nouvelles structures de la régulation et de la supervision financières 
de l’Union européenne’, in: Evolutions récentes en droit financier, Brussels, Bruylant, 2015, 
at 23–24; S. Allegrezza and I. Rodopoulos, ‘Enforcing Prudential Banking Regulations in 
the Eurozone: A Reading from the Viewpoint of Criminal Law’, in: K. Ligeti and V. 
Franssen (eds.), Challenges in the Field of Economic and Financial Crime in Europe and 
the US, Oxford/Portland, Hart, at 241.  
165  See Chapter 3 (Resolution) of the SRM Regulation. 
166  Article 34 of the SRM Regulation. 
167  Article 35(1)(a) of the SRM Regulation. 
168  Article 35(1)(c) of the SRM Regulation. 
169  Article 36 of the SRM Regulation. 
170  Article 38 of the SRM Regulation. 
171  Article 39 of the SRM Regulation. 
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Under Article 38(2) of the SRM Regulation, the SRB may fine a supervised entity 
if it finds that such entity has committed, intentionally or negligently,172 one of the 
following infringements:  
– the entity concerned did not supply the information requested pursuant to Arti-
cle 34 of the SRM Regulation; 
– the entity did not submit to a general investigation or an on-site inspection pursu-
ant to Articles 35 and 36 of the SRM Regulation; or 
– the entity did not comply with a decision addressed to it by the SRB pursuant to 
Article 29 of the SRM Regulation. 
If one leaves aside the latter type of infringement, which takes place in the context 
of a resolution action, one could label the above sanctioning power of the SRB as the 
power to fine a supervised entity for ‘obstruction of justice’. 
●  Level of Penalty 
The fine imposed by the SRB is set on the basis of a two-step method, which is 
somewhat comparable to the fining method of the European Commission in cartel 
cases (supra, Part II, B.2.). First, the SRB will determine the basic amount of the 
fine, which should be a percentage ranging between 0.05 per cent and 0.5 per cent 
of the total annual net turnover of the supervised entity.173 Second, this basic amount 
will subsequently be adjusted in the light of (a long list of) mitigating and aggravat-
ing factors174 that are laid down in Article 38(5) and (6). Next, Article 38(9) of the 
SRM Regulation defines the coefficients linked to the various aggravating and miti-
gating factors, while Article 38(4) regulates how to calculate the fine in case there is 
more than one coefficient to apply. Together, these provisions almost render the cal-
culation of the fine mathematical. The precision of this calculation process sharply 
contrasts with the wide discretion the ECB enjoys (supra, Part II, C.2.).  
In principle, the total fine should not exceed one per cent of the supervised entity’s 
annual turnover.175 Nonetheless, it is possible to derogate from this absolute maxi-
mum ‘where the entity has directly or indirectly benefited financially from that in-
fringement and where profits gained or losses avoided because of the infringement 
____________ 
172  Article 38(1) of the SRM Regulation. It is noteworthy that paragraph 2 of the afore-
mentioned provision explicitly defines the term ‘intentionally’: ‘An infringement by such an 
entity shall be considered to have been committed intentionally if there are objective factors 
which demonstrate that the entity or its management body or senior management acted de-
liberately to commit the infringement’. 
173  Article 38(3) of the SRM Regulation. 
174  Article 38(4) of the SRM Regulation. 
175  Article 38(7), para. 1 of the SRM Regulation. 
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can be determined’.176 In that case, the fine should be ‘at least equal to that financial 
benefit’.177 
Finally, in case an act or omission constitutes more than one infringement, only 
the higher fine will apply.178 
–  Periodic Penalty Payments 
●  Scope of Application 
Next to that, Article 39 of the SRM Regulation provides that the SRB is entitled 
to impose periodic penalty payments to compel the supervised entity:179 
– to comply with an information request pursuant to Article 34 of the SRM Regula-
tion; or 
– to submit to investigations or on-site inspections pursuant to the SRB’s investiga-
tive powers under Articles 35 and 36 of the SRM Regulation. 
It is noteworthy that, contrary to the periodic penalty payments that may be im-
posed by the ECB (supra, Part II, C.2.), the purpose here is not to punish but merely 
to ensure compliance. 
●  Level of Penalty 
The amount of the periodic pecuniary payment shall be 0.1 per cent of the average 
daily turnover of the supervised entity in the preceding business year.180 This amount 
may, however, be adapted (i.e. increased) to ensure that the penalty is effective and 
proportionate as required by Article 39(2) of the SRM Regulation.  
A periodic penalty payment shall be imposed on a daily basis until the supervised 
entity complies with the relevant decisions, yet without exceeding a period of six 
months.181  
–  Publication of the Sanctioning Decision 
Similar to the ECB, all sanctions imposed by the SRB should be published on the 
SRB website except where such publication could endanger the resolution of the 
supervised entity.182 Under certain circumstances, the publication can also be anon-
____________ 
176  Article 38(7), para. 2 of the SRM Regulation. 
177  Article 38(7), para. 2 of the SRM Regulation. 
178  Article 38(7), para. 3 of the SRM Regulation. 
179  Article 39 of the SRM Regulation.  
180  Article 39(3) of the SRM Regulation. 
181  Article 39(2) and (4) of the SRM Regulation. 
182  Article 41 of the SRM Regulation. 
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ymized. This publication requirement could be considered as having a punitive char-
acter and as an additional ‘sanction’ for the supervised entities.183 At the moment of 
finalizing this contribution, no such publication can be found on the SRB website, 
suggesting the administrative penalties explained above have not yet been applied, 
or if they have, that any publicity about those penalties was considered harmful for 
the resolution process.  
4.  Conclusion 
The above leads us to conclude that the sanctioning powers of the SRB are quite 
similar to those of the ECB described above, even if their scope of application differ. 
The main differences between the two authorities are the level of sanctions and the 
discretion granted to the sanctioning authority. The upper limits of the fines and pe-
riodic penalty payments imposed under the framework of the SRM are well below 
those imposed by the ECB. Moreover, the ECB enjoys much wider discretion in 
determining the level of the penalty than the SRB and provides very limited public 
explanation about the way it calculates its penalties. Sanctioning practice, however, 
is still very limited and to the extent appeals have been lodged against the ECB’s 
fining decisions, no judicial decision has been rendered so far. 
D.  EU Market Abuse 
1.  Introduction 
The EU first set common minimum rules to combat market abuse and insider trad-
ing in 2003. The purpose was (and still is) to complete the single market for financial 
services, to ensure the smooth functioning of the securities markets, and to strengthen 
public confidence in securities and derivatives.184 Despite some amendments in 2008 
and 2010, the 2003 Market Abuse Directive185 (hereinafter: 2003 MAD) was con-
sidered ineffective and replaced by two legal instruments, a new Market Abuse Di-
rective186 (hereinafter: 2014 MAD) and a Market Abuse Regulation187 (hereinafter: 
____________ 
183  S. Allegrezza and O. Voordeckers, ‘Investigative and Sanctioning Powers of the ECB 
in the Framework of the Single Monetary Mechanism, Mapping the Complexity of a New 
Enforcement Model’, 4 eucrim 151 (2015), at 157–158. 
184  Recitals (2) and (3) of the Preamble of the 2003 MAD.  
185  Directive No 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on insider deal-
ing and market manipulation (market abuse), 28 January 2003, OJ L 96, 12 April 2003, at 
16. 
186  Directive No 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and the Council on criminal 
sanctions for market abuse, 16 April 2014, OJ L 173, 12 June 2014, at 179. 
187  Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council on market 
abuse and repealing Directive No 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
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MAR), replacing the 2003 MAD. By means of these new legal instruments, the EU 
legislator adopted a dual-track (or two-pronged) approach combining an administra-
tive track (where national and supranational authorities cooperate with one another 
to enforce EU law) with a criminal track (where national judicial authorities are in 
charge). 
The MAR188 contains a highly elaborated regime of administrative enforcement, 
which is directly applicable at national level. It contains far-reaching supervisory and 
investigative powers for (national) competent authorities,189 and reinforces the coop-
eration between those authorities and the European Securities and Markets Authori-
ties (hereinafter: ESMA).190 Some of these powers are comparable to the investiga-
tive powers judicial authorities have (e.g. they may require existing recordings of 
telephone conversations, electronic communications or traffic data held by invest-
ment firms, credit institutions or financial institutions),191 or may potentially require 
the intervention of judicial authorities (e.g. the search of premises and seizure of 
documents).192  
The establishment of ESMA predates the new EU legal framework on market 
abuse, as it was established in 2010,193 in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, 
and became operational on 1 January 2011.194 ESMA is one of the three European 
supervisory authorities which constitute the European System of Financial Supervi-
sion.195 ESMA assumes, together with NCAs, a general supervisory role of the fi-
nancial markets; as such, their powers definitely go beyond the mere enforcement of 
____________ 
and Commission Directives No 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC, and 2004/72/EC, OJ L 173, 12 
June 2014, at 1. 
188  For a broader analysis of this Regulation, see e.g. J. Lau Hansen, ‘Market Abuse Case 
Law – Where Do We Stand With MAR?’, 2 E.C.F.R. 367 (2017), at 367–390.  
189  Article 23(2) of the MAR. 
190  Articles 24–25 of the MAR. 
191  Article 23(2), para. 1(g) of the MAR. 
192  Article 23(2), para. 1(e) and para. 2 of the MAR. 
193  Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and 
Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Deci-
sion No 2009/77/EC, OJ L 331, 15 December 2010, at 84 (hereinafter: ESMA Regulation). 
194  See https://www.esma.europa.eu/about-esma/who-we-are (last accessed 17 June 
2018).  
195  The other two authorities are the European Banking Authority and the European In-
surance and Occupational Pensions Authority. For more information about the European 
System of Financial Supervision and the applicable legal framework, see the European Com-
mission’s website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-fi-
nance/financial-supervision-and-risk-management/european-system-financial-supervi-
sion_en (last accessed 16 April 2019). For a further analysis of the European System of 
Financial Supervision, see e.g. I.H.-Y. Chiu, ‘Power and Accountability in the EU Financial 
Regulatory Architecture: Examining Inter-Agency Relations, Agency Independence and Ac-
countability’, 8 Eur. J. Legal Stud. 67 (2015).  
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market abuse rules. As will be explained below, ESMA does not have any direct 
sanctioning powers; those powers are situated at the national level.  
This contribution will mainly focus on the respective powers of ESMA and NCAs 
relating to the administrative sanctions and measures applicable to market abuse, as 
these powers most likely qualify as ‘criminal’ sanctions in the meaning of Articles 6 
and 7 of the ECHR. A more in-depth analysis of the 2014 MAD, which imposes 
minimum rules for the definition of criminal offences and for criminal sanctions on 
the Member States, exceeds the purpose of this contribution; that legal framework 
clearly belongs to realm of EU criminal law.196 
2.  The Role of ESMA 
Contrary to the European Commission in the field of EU competition law and the 
ECB and SRB in the area of EU banking law (supra, Part II, B. and C.), ESMA does 
not have sanctioning powers of its own. Instead, it fulfils a coordinating role between 
national competent authorities,  
in particular in situations where adverse developments could potentially jeopardise the 
orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the financial sys-
tem in the Union.197  
It shall, for instance, promote a coordinated response to market abuse by ‘facili-
tating the exchange of information between competent authorities’.198 This exchange 
of information is part of the NCAs’ obligation to cooperate with each other and with 
ESMA as spelt out by Article 25 of the MAR. In accordance with paragraph 1 of this 
provision, competent authorities ‘shall exchange information without undue delay 
and cooperate in investigation, supervision and enforcement activities’. In case the 
requested competent authority does not act within a reasonable time or reject the 
request for information or assistance, the competent authority which issued the re-
quest may refer that lack of action or that refusal to ESMA,199 which may mediate 
and assist both authorities to reach an agreement,200 or investigate the situation of 
non-compliance, address a recommendation to the requested competent authority, 
and if need be, even oblige it to comply.201 To ensure uniform conditions of applica-
tion for the cooperation between NCAs, ESMA is also mandated to develop ‘draft 
____________ 
196  See e.g. V. Franssen, ‘EU Criminal Law and Effet Utile – A Critical Examination of 
the Use of Criminal Law to Achieve Effective Enforcement’, in: J. Banach-Guttierez and C. 
Harding (eds.), EU Criminal Law and Policy: Values, Principles and Methods, Routledge, 
2016, at 95–99. 
197  Article 31, para. 1 of the ESMA Regulation. 
198  Article 31, para. 2 of the ESMA Regulation. 
199  Article 25(7) of the MAR. 
200  Article 19(1) of the ESMA Regulation. 
201  Article 17 of the ESMA Regulation. 
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implementing technical standards to determine the procedures and forms for ex-
change of information and assistance’.202 On the basis of ESMA’s draft,203 the Eu-
ropean Commission adopted an implementing regulation laying out those standards 
on 26 February 2018.204 
Furthermore, ESMA shall also regularly conduct peer reviews of the activities of 
the NCAs to strengthen the consistency and effectiveness of the enforcement of EU 
market abuse rules, which includes an assessment of: 
the effectiveness and the degree of convergence reached with regard to the enforcement 
of the provisions adopted in the implementation of Union law, including the administra-
tive measures and sanctions imposed against persons responsible where those provisions 
have not been complied with.205 
To enable this oversight, NCAs have the obligation to give ESMA every year ‘ag-
gregated information regarding all administrative sanctions and other administrative 
measures’ that they have imposed in accordance with Articles 30-32 of the MAR, as 
well as ‘anonymized and aggregated data regarding all administrative investigations’ 
that they have undertaken on that basis.206 Similarly, Article 33(2) of the MAR 
obliges NCAs to provide ESMA annually information on all criminal investigations 
that have been undertaken and the criminal penalties that have been imposed by na-
tional judicial authorities, to the extent the Member States have opted for criminal 
enforcement pursuant to Article 30(1), para. 2 of the MAR.207 On the basis of the 
information provided by the NCAs, ESMA shall then publish an annual report.208 To 
streamline the exchange of that information, the European Commission adopted on 
____________ 
202  Article 25(9) of the MAR. 
203  ESMA, Final report: Draft Implementing Technical Standards on forms and proce-
dures for cooperation between competent authorities under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 
on market abuse, 30 May 2017, available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/de-
fault/files/library/esma70-145-100_final_report_draft_its_cooperation_between_ncas_
art_25_of_mar.pdf (last accessed 19 April 2019). 
204  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/292 of 26 February 2018 laying 
down implementing technical standards with regard to procedures and forms for exchange 
of information and assistance between competent authorities according to Regulation (EU) 
No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on market abuse, OJ L 55, 27 
February 2018, at 34. 
205  Article 30(2)(d) of the ESMA Regulation, emphasis added. 
206  Article 33(1) of the MAR, emphasis added. 
207  The following Member States exercised that option: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ire-
land, and Poland. See ESMA, Annual report on administrative and criminal sanctions and 
other administrative measures under MAR, 15 November 2018, at 4, para. 6, available at: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/file/49748/download?token=oQJfIQOk (last accessed on 19 
April 2019) (hereinafter: ESMA’s first annual report on sanctions). 
208  Article 33(1) and (2) of the MAR. 
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29 June 2017 an implementing regulation with technical standards determining the 
procedures and forms of exchange NCAs should follow.209  
ESMA’s first annual report on sanctions was published on 15 November 2018, 
covering the period from 3 July 2016, the date of entry into force of the MAR, until 
31 December 2017.210 This report indicates that the NCAs did not impose any sanc-
tions under the new MAR legal framework in 2016, which is understandable as the 
adoption of a sanction is necessarily preceded by a proper investigation. But even if 
the NCAs did impose sanctions on the basis of the MAR in 2017, ESMA still does 
not consider the received data representative of the enforcement activities performed 
by national authorities and therefore is unable ‘to observe trends or tendencies in the 
imposition of sanctions’.211 In other words, it is definitely too soon to evaluate the 
impact of the MAR on the effectiveness of the new market abuse rules.  
It should also be stressed that this first report does not provide a complete overview 
of all sanctions imposed by NCAs during the covered period. On the one hand, it 
does not include information about administrative or criminal sanctions that were 
imposed on the basis of national legislation implementing the 2003 MAD.212 On the 
other, it does not cover the criminal investigations and sanctions based on the 2014 
MAD. Indeed, ESMA only coordinates and supervises the enforcement action by 
national competent administrative authorities, not by national judicial authorities. 
This lack of supervision on the part of an EU authority has been identified, very early 
on, as a ‘reason for concern’ by certain authors: ultimately, national judicial author-
ities will simply continue to determine their own criminal policy as there is no EU 
authority which can force them to start an investigation or which coordinates poten-
tial cross-border investigations (market abuse does not belong to Eurojust’s compe-
tences).213 This may result in a waste of resources and a duplication of investigations 
____________ 
209  ESMA sent its draft implementing technical standards, elaborated on the basis of Ar-
ticle 33(5) MAR, to the European Commission on 26 July 2016. See https://www.esma.eu-
ropa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2016-1171_final_report_mar_its_sanc-
tions_and_measures.pdf (last accessed 19 April 2019). The Commission’s implementing 
regulation was adopted one year later and entered into force on 20 July 2017: Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1158 of 29 June 2017 laying down implementing tech-
nical standards with regards to the procedures and forms for competent authorities exchang-
ing information with the European Securities Market Authority as referred to in Article 33 
of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 167, 
30 June 2017, at 22. 
210  See ESMA, ESMA reports on NCAs’ use of sanctions and administrative measures 
under MAR (hereinafter: ESMA’s first annual report on sanctions), press release, 15 Novem-
ber 2018, available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-reports-
ncas%E2%80%99-use-sanctions-and-administrative-measures-under-mar.  
211  ESMA’s first annual report on sanctions, at 6, para. 10. 
212  ESMA’s first annual report on sanctions, at 6, para. 9. 
213  M. Luchtman and J. Vervaele, ‘Enforcing the Market Abuse Regime: Towards an In-
tegrated Model of Criminal and Administrative Law Enforcement in the European Union?’, 
5 NJECL 193 (2014), at 216. 
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and prosecutions across Member States, all the more since there is no EU authority 
either which ‘is competent to solve conflicts of jurisdiction at the interface of crimi-
nal and administrative law’.214 In our view, it is very likely that national judicial 
authorities will shy away from complicated, costly, and time-consuming criminal 
investigations in the area of market abuse, thereby undermining the main purpose of 
adopting minimum rules for criminal offences and sanctions in the field of market 
abuse. 
3.  The Sanctioning Powers of NCAs 
While ESMA fulfils a coordinating and facilitating role, the actual sanctioning 
powers for market abuse infringements are thus entrusted to the NCAs. These sanc-
tioning powers are regulated by Articles 30 and 31 of the MAR. The powers can be 
exercised against both natural and legal persons. 
Among the variety of administrative sanctions and measures that Member States 
have to provide for at the national level are a cease and desist order,215 the disgorge-
ment of the profits or avoided losses,216 a public warning,217 the withdrawal or sus-
pension of the authorization of an investment firm,218 a temporary or sometimes even 
permanent ban of a person discharging managerial responsibilities or responsible for 
the infringement from exercising managerial responsibilities in investment firms and 
from dealing on his/her own account,219 and maximum administrative pecuniary 
sanctions which, for the most serious infringements, amount to at least €5 million for 
natural persons220 and to at least €15 million or 15 per cent of the total annual turn-
over for legal persons.221 The same rules apply to the failure to cooperate or to com-
ply with the administrative investigation (i.e. obstruction of justice).222 The rules laid 
down in the MAR are only minimum rules; so national law may provide for (even) 
more severe sanctions.223 
Furthermore, it should be noted that, although the MAR requires the foregoing 
administrative sanctions, it does not entirely annihilate the choice for Member States 
____________ 
214  M. Luchtman and J. Vervaele, ‘Enforcing the Market Abuse Regime: Towards an In-
tegrated Model of Criminal and Administrative Law Enforcement in the European Union?’, 
5 NJECL 193 (2014), at 216. 
215  Article 30(2)(a) of the MAR. 
216  Article 30(2)(b) of the MAR. 
217  Article 30(2)(c) of the MAR. 
218  Article 30(2)(d) of the MAR. 
219  Article 30(2)(e), (f), and (g) of the MAR. 
220  Article 30(2)(i) of the MAR. 
221  Article 30(2)(j) of the MAR. 
222  Article 30(1)(b) of the MAR. 
223  Article 30(3) of the MAR. 
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between administrative and criminal sanctions.224 Indeed, when the market abuse 
infringements defined by the MAR are already subject to criminal sanctions at na-
tional level, Member States ‘may decide’ not to adopt the administrative sanctions 
listed in Article 30(1) of the MAR.225 However, Member States are also free to lay 
down both administrative and criminal sanctions, provided that this ‘does not lead to 
a breach of the ne bis in idem principle’.226 
Article 32(1) of the MAR defines the relevant circumstances that NCAs should 
take into account in determining the type and level of administrative sanctions, in-
cluding: 
– the gravity and duration of the infringement; 
– the degree of responsibility of the person who is responsible for the infringement;  
– the financial strength of that person, which can be determined on the basis of that 
person’s total turnover (in case of legal persons)227 or annual income (in case of 
natural persons); 
– the importance of the illegal profits; 
– the level of cooperation of that person, though ‘without prejudice to the need to 
ensure disgorgement of profits gained or losses avoided by that person’; 
– the previous infringements committed by that person; and  
– the potential measures the person has taken to prevent future misconduct. 
The above sanctioning criteria give expression to several sentencing principles, in 
particular the principle of proportionality and the principle of culpability. 
Moreover, paragraph 2 of Article 32 of the MAR obliges Member States to coop-
erate closely to ensure that the administrative sanctions imposed are ‘effective and 
appropriate’ and to coordinate their action with respect to cross-border cases ‘in or-
der to avoid duplication and overlaps’. The latter, however, does not go as far as to 
explicitly recognize the application of the ne bis in idem principle.  
In addition, in accordance with Article 34(1) of the MAR, NCAs have the obliga-
tion to publish:  
any decision imposing an administrative sanction or other administrative measure (…) on 
their website immediately after the person subject to that decision has been informed of 
that decision. Such publication shall include at least information on the type and nature of 
the infringement and the identity of the person subject to the decision. 
____________ 
224  This choice already existed under the 2003 MAD which required ‘effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive’ measures, ‘without prejudice to the right of the Member States to 
impose criminal sanctions’ (Art. 14(1)). For an application of this requirement, see e.g. Case 
C-45/08, Spector v. CBFA, 23 December 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:806. 
225  Article 30(1), para. 2 of the MAR. 
226  Recital (23) of the Preamble of the 2014 MAD. 
227  In case the legal person is a ‘parent undertaking’, ‘the relevant total turnover shall be 
that total annual turnover’. Article 30(2), para. 3 of the MAR. 
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In principle, the publication shall remain accessible on the competent authority’s 
website for at least five years.228 The conditions of this publication obligation 
strongly resemble the ones set out previously with respect to the ECB’s sanctioning 
decisions in the area of EU banking law (supra, Part II, C.2.). 
Nevertheless, if the publication of the identity of the natural or legal person ‘would 
be disproportionate (…) or where such publication would jeopardise an ongoing in-
vestigation or the stability of the financial markets’,229 the competent authority can 
defer or anonymize the publication of the decision or even refrain from publishing 
under certain conditions.230 Again, this reminds us of the possibility of anonymizing 
or deferring the publication under EU banking law, with the difference that Arti-
cle 132 of the SSM Framework Regulation does not allow to refrain from publication 
(supra, Part II, C.2.). 
4.  Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis of the applicable legal framework, one can conclude 
that the exercise of the sanctioning powers with respect to EU market abuse differs 
from EU competition law and EU banking law in the sense that the ESMA has no 
direct sanctioning powers. Yet, while the enforcement of EU market abuse rules still 
remains strongly decentralized, the adoption of the MAR imposing minimum rules 
for administrative sanctions along with the supervisory and coordinating role of 
ESMA is meant to ensure a more coherent enforcement of market abuse rules by 
NCAs throughout the Union as well as ‘swift and efficient cooperation’ between 
those national authorities.231 It is, however, too early to evaluate the impact of the 
new legal rules in this respect. 
As regards the applicable administrative sanctions, one will have noted that, com-
pared to EU competition law and EU banking law, the MAR provides for more di-
verse administrative sanctions, ranging from mainly preventive to strongly punitive 
ones, and their broader personal scope of application, including both legal and natu-
ral persons. In addition to pecuniary sanctions, the MAR also includes a cease and 
desist order (cf. EU competition law; supra, Part II, B.2.), a public warning, the with-
drawal or suspension of the authorization of an investment firm and several types of 
professional bans. 
____________ 
228  Article 34(3) of the MAR. 
229  Article 34(1), para. 3 of the MAR. 
230  Article 34(1), para. 3(a)–(c) of the MAR. 
231  M. Luchtman and J. Vervaele, ‘Enforcing the Market Abuse Regime: Towards an In-
tegrated Model of Criminal and Administrative Law Enforcement in the European Union?’, 
5 NJECL 193 (2014), at 215–216. 
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E.   Some Common Characteristics of Sanctions  
under EU Administrative Criminal Law 
The foregoing analysis of the administrative sanctions and measures applicable in 
the three selected areas of EU administrative law has clearly revealed a common 
preference for pecuniary sanctions, despite the use of different labels (fines, pecuni-
ary penalties, and periodic penalty payments) and the different objectives they pursue 
(deterrence, punishment of past behaviours, or a means of pressure to ensure com-
pliance). This preference for pecuniary sanctions can probably be explained by the 
economic or financial nature of the infringements. Nevertheless, as we argued else-
where, pecuniary sanctions are not always the most adequate sanctions, even in the 
area of economic and financial crime.232 In all three areas, the maximum of the pe-
cuniary sanctions is determined as a function of the annual turnover of the legal per-
son or annual income of the natural person. Pecuniary sanctions must be effective, 
proportionate (mainly in the meaning of ‘severe enough’),233 and dissuasive (EU 
banking law and, less expressly, EU market abuse), or even plainly deterrent (EU 
competition law). Disgorgement of profits or avoided losses is an important recurring 
sanctioning factor: either the fine takes into account the profits made or losses 
avoided by the infringement (EU competition law and EU banking law) or disgorge-
ment can be a self-standing sanction (EU market abuse).  
In addition to pecuniary sanctions, cease and desist orders are common practice 
in EU competition law and also possible under the current legal framework of EU 
market abuse. The greatest diversity of sanctions is clearly offered by the MAR, but 
it remains to be seen to what extent these non-pecuniary sanctions will be applied.234 
Perhaps most telling in view of distilling specific characteristics of EU adminis-
trative criminal law is the impossibility, in all three sectors, of imposing a depriva-
tion of liberty. This is quite logical as EU competition law and EU banking law 
mainly or even only targets legal persons which, by nature, cannot be imprisoned. 
Nevertheless, even in the area of EU market abuse, administrative deprivation of 
liberty of the responsible natural persons is not provided for. 
Finally, the publication of sanctioning decisions is an obligation in all three sec-
tors, but this obligation can be attenuated (to avoid revealing business secrets—EU 
____________ 
232  See V. Franssen, ‘The EU’s Fight against Corporate Financial Crime: State of Affairs 
and Future Potential’, 19 German Law Journal 1221 (2018), at 1242–1249. 
233  Elsewhere, we have argued to that the EU’s three-pronged qualitative requirement as 
regards sanctions has both a sword and a shield function, comparing the proportionality prin-
ciple in that standard requirement to a ‘Janus face’. See V. Franssen, European Sentencing 
Principles for Corporations, doctoral dissertation, Leuven, KU Leuven, 2013, at 198–220. 
234  If one thing, ESMA’s first annual report on sanctions (at 6–8, para. 14) revealed that 
non-pecuniary sanctions are less often applied than pecuniary ones, especially with respect 
to the core infringements of market manipulation, insider dealing, and unlawful disclosure 
of inside information. It is a pity, though, that the report did not specify which non-pecuniary 
sanctions were applied by NCAs. 
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competition law—, so as not to jeopardize the stability of the financial markets or 
ongoing criminal investigations, or to prevent disproportionate damage to the per-
son/entity in point—EU banking law and EU market abuse) or even overruled 
(though only in the area of EU market abuse). Practice, however, varies strongly 
across the three sectors. The European Commission has a strong and tough publica-
tion (and communication) policy, insisting on the fact that cartel offences are not 
tolerated and are harmful to consumers and competition. Clearly, publication fulfils 
a ‘naming and shaming’ function in this sector and is meant to set an example for 
other undertakings. In doing so, the Commission also provides substantial transpar-
ency about its fining decisions. This practice is in stark contrast with the very mini-
malistic communication by the ECB, probably out of concern for the impact on the 
overall financial system. As far as we can tell on the basis of ESMA’s first annual 
report on sanctions, the possibility to anonymize or to refrain from publishing has 
already been used by NCAs, but moderately.  
After these first conclusions highlighting some common characteristics of the 
sanctions provided for in the three areas of EU punitive administrative law, it is now 
time to take a closer look at their ‘true’ nature: are they really (purely) administrative 
in nature; if not, which characteristics do they share with criminal sanctions? To this 
end, we will first briefly analyse the meaning of the term ‘criminal’ in the case law 
of the ECtHR and its impact at EU level. 
III.  Criminal Nature of Sanctions in EU  
Punitive Administrative Law? 
A.  Introduction 
1.  Definition of the Term ‘Criminal’ by the ECtHR 
According to well-established case law, the ECtHR applies an autonomous defi-
nition to the notions of ‘criminal charge’ (Article 6 of the ECHR) and ‘penalty’ (Ar-
ticle 7 of the ECHR). The Court’s definition of the terms ‘criminal’/’penalty’ is of 
key importance because it determines the scope of the criminal procedural and sub-
stantive rights of those two provisions. Furthermore, it is also relevant for the scope 
of application of other rights and principles under the Convention, such as the right 
to liberty and security (‘offence’ in Article 5(1) of the ECHR), the right to property 
(‘penalties’ in Article 1(2) of the First Protocol to the ECHR), and the principle of 
ne bis in idem (‘penal procedure’ in Article 4 of Protocol No 7).235  
____________ 
235  See e.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Zolotukhin v. Russia, 10 February 2009, para. 52; 
ECtHR, Ruotsalainen v. Finland, 16 June 2009, para. 42; ECtHR, Tomasovic v. Croatia, 18 
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The logic behind the Court’s approach is crystal clear: without such an autono-
mous definition, Contracting States could quite easily avoid the application of the 
Convention’s safeguards by not labelling a charge or sanction ‘criminal’.236 because 
different labels (criminal, civil, or administrative) principally trigger different pro-
cedures, each with their own substantive and procedural safeguards. 
The basis for the ECtHR’s autonomous definition of the notion of ‘criminal 
charge’ was laid down in the famous judgment Engel and others v. the Nether-
lands.237 Since then, the Court has further elaborated, clarified, and refined the de-
fining criteria it put forward in Engel, in a large number of cases, an exercise that 
continues until today. The initial Engel criteria, however, remain at the core of its 
definition.  
Briefly summarized,238 the criminal nature of a penalty (charge or procedure) is to 
be assessed on the basis of the following criteria:  
– the legal categorization of the penalty under domestic law; 
– the very nature of the offence; 
– the type and degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks. 
The first criterion solely relies on the legal classification given to the penalty under 
national law. This criterion is a starting point,239 which means that if national law 
does not categorize an offence as criminal, the relevant national court ensuring re-
spect of the Convention’s safeguards will have to look ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ the na-
tional classification and examine the second and/or third criterion.240  
The second and third criteria entail a more substantial analysis of the proceedings 
and the penalty to be imposed. For instance, in evaluating the nature of the offence 
a number of factors (or sub-criteria) can be taken into account, such as (i) whether 
____________ 
October 2011, paras. 18–19; ECtHR, Muslija v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 January 2014, 
para. 25. 
236  See e.g. ECtHR (Plenary), Engel and others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, para. 81. 
Since then explicitly reaffirmed in e.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Ezeh and Connors v. 
United Kingdom, 9 October 2003, para. 100; ECtHR, Matyjek v. Poland (Dec.), 30 May 
2006, para. 45. 
237  ECtHR (Plenary), Engel and others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976. 
238  For a much more extensive analysis, see V. Franssen, ‘La notion ‘pénale’: mot ma-
gique ou critère trompeur? Réflexions sur les distinctions entre le droit pénal et le droit quasi 
pénal’, in: D. Brach-Thiel (ed.), Existe-t-il un seul non bis in idem aujourd’hui?, Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 2017, at 64–80; V. Franssen, European Sentencing Principles for Corpora-
tions, doctoral dissertation, Leuven, KU Leuven, 2013, at 135 et seq. 
239  ECtHR, Weber v. Switzerland, 22 May 1990, para 31.  
240  ECtHR (Plenary), Engel v. The Netherlands, 8 June 1976, para 82. 
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the legal rule in question is of a generally binding character,241 (ii) whether the pro-
ceedings are applied by a public body with statutory powers of enforcement,242 (iii) 
whether the infringement concerns the general interests of society which are nor-
mally protected by the criminal law,243 (iv) whether the legal rule has a punitive or 
deterrent purpose,244 (v) whether the imposition of a penalty is dependent upon a 
finding of guilt,245 or (vi) whether comparable procedures are classified as criminal 
in other national legal systems.246 As to the third criterion, to determine the (nature 
and) severity of the penalty, the ECtHR considers ‘the maximum potential penalty 
for which the relevant law provides’ (i.e. the penalty the person concerned ‘risks 
incurring’247), emphasizing that the actual penalty ‘cannot diminish the importance 
of what was initially at stake’.248 While it is definitely true that imprisonment occu-
pies a central position in the Court’s case law in respect of the third criterion,249 one 
can observe, in recent years, a growing attention to financial penalties250 and other 
types of sanctions, such as professional disqualification orders251 or the dismissal 
from public office.252 This evolution is, of course, particularly relevant for the three 
____________ 
241  ECtHR, Lauko v. Slovakia, 2 September 1998, para 58; ECtHR, Bendenoun v. France, 
24 February 1994, para 47. 
242  ECtHR, Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, para 56. 
243  ECtHR, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 27 September 2011, paras. 40–41, 
with reference to ECtHR, Stenuit v. France. 
244  ECtHR, Blokhin v. Russia, 23 March 2016, paras 179–180; ECtHR, Jussila v. Finland, 
23 November 2006, para 38; ECtHR, Ezeh & Connors v. the United Kingdom, 9 October 
2003, para 147; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, 21 February 1984, para 53. 
245  ECtHR, Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, para 56.  
246  ECtHR, Matyjek v. Poland, 30 May 2006, paras 49–50; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Germany, 
21 February 1984, Series A No. 73, para 53. 
247  ECtHR (Plenary), Engel v. The Netherlands, 8 June 1976, para 82. 
248  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Ezeh and Connors v. United Kingdom, 9 October 2003, 
para. 120. See e.g. also ECtHR, Tomasovic v. Croatia, 18 October 2011, para. 23. 
249  In Engel the Court established a rebuttable presumption that penalties involving a dep-
rivation of liberty belong to the ‘criminal’ sphere unless, as discussed earlier, ‘their nature, 
duration or manner of execution cannot be appreciably detrimental’. ECtHR (Plenary), En-
gel and others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, para. 82. Nevertheless, the Court does not 
always rigorously follow its own logic in subsequent cases. See e.g. ECtHR, Campbell and 
Fell v. United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, para. 72. Cf. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Ezeh and 
Connors v. United Kingdom, 9 October 2003, para. 127. 
250  For instance, in Öztürk, the Court observed that ‘according to the ordinary meaning of 
the terms, there generally come within the ambit of the criminal law offences that make their 
perpetrators liable to penalties intended, inter alia, to be deterrent and usually consisting of 
fines and of measures depriving the person of his liberty’. ECtHR (Plenary), Öztürk v. Ger-
many, 21 February 1984, para. 53, emphasis added. 
251  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014, para 97. 
252  See e.g. ECtHR, Matyjek v. Poland (Dec.), 30 May 2006, paras. 54–55: in this case, 
the Court ruled that the Polish proceedings for lustration were criminal in nature, even 
though this offence is not punished with imprisonment or a fine, but with the automatic 
dismissal from the public function exercised by the offender and the prohibition to apply for 
a public post during the next ten years. The Court was in particular sensitive to the fact that 
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selected areas of EU punitive administrative law: while none of them entails the pos-
sibility of a deprivation of liberty, they all provide for (very) substantial financial 
penalties and, in the case of market abuse, also temporary or even permanent profes-
sional bans.  
The second and third criteria are in principle alternative, not cumulative. One of 
these two criteria may thus suffice to regard a charge as criminal in its autonomous 
meaning under Article 6 of the ECHR.253 In practice this means that when the nature 
of the offence in question is found to be criminal, the ECtHR does not even consider 
the third criterion anymore.254 Nevertheless, ‘where the separate analysis of each 
criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of 
a “criminal charge”’, a cumulative approach may still be adopted.255 
When the ECtHR comes to the conclusion that the penalty concerned is of a ‘crim-
inal’ nature, this implies that the criminal law guarantees provided by the ECHR are, 
in principle, applicable to the person incurring such penalty, regardless of its national 
legal classification.256 
It should be noted that the Court’s definition of the notion of ‘criminal charge’ has 
substantially expanded over the years, to include many types of proceedings and of-
fences which would probably not have been considered criminal back in the early 
years.257 One could argue that the Court thereby simply tried to compensate for the 
increasing use at the national level of administrative and civil enforcement tools pur-
suing the same or analogous purposes as criminal sanctions. In other words, by ex-
panding the scope of the notion of ‘criminal’, the Court only wanted to ensure that 
____________ 
the prohibition to practise certain professions for such a long period ‘may have a very serious 
impact on a person, depriving him or her of the possibility of continuing professional life’. 
253  See e.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Ezeh and Connors v. United Kingdom, 9 October 
2003, para. 86. 
254  See e.g. ECtHR (Plenary), Öztürk v. Germany, 21 February 1984, para. 54; ECtHR, 
Lauko v. Slovakia, 2 September 1998, para. 58. 
255  ECtHR, Lauko v. Slovakia, 2 September 1998, para. 57. See e.g. also ECtHR, Jano-
sevic v. Sweden, 23 July 2002, para. 67. Examples of a cumulative approach combining the 
second and third criterion can for instance be found in: ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v. United 
Kingdom, 28 June 1984, paras. 71–73; ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Ezeh and Connors v. 
United Kingdom, 9 October 2003, paras. 107 and 130. 
256  V. Franssen, ‘La notion ‘pénale’: mot magique ou critère trompeur? Réflexions sur 
les distinctions entre le droit pénal et le droit quasi pénal’, in: D. Brach-Thiel (ed.), Existe-t-
il un seul non bis in idem aujourd’hui ?, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2017, at 64–65; P. Caeiro, ‘The 
influence of the EU on the “blurring” between administrative and criminal law’, in: F. Galli 
and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Do labels still matter? Blurring boundaries between adminis-
trative and criminal law, The Influence of the EU, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, 2014, at 175. 
257  The ECtHR has even admitted this explicitly. See e.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 
Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 43 (‘the autonomous interpretation adopted by 
the Convention institutions of the notion of a “criminal charge” by applying the Engel crite-
ria have underpinned a gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belong-
ing to the traditional categories of the criminal law’). 
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the persons affected by these alternative enforcement tools receive adequate protec-
tion. Yet, the inevitable consequence of the Court’s expanding definition is that the 
substantive and procedural rights of the ECHR now apply to a large number of cases, 
not only cases where the Contracting States never intended to apply those criminal 
rights—which has never been an obstacle for the Court to apply its own definition—
but also to cases where criminal safeguards are perhaps not really necessary.258 
Therefore, in an attempt to counterbalance its extending criminal universe, the 
ECtHR introduced in Jussila v. Finland a new distinction between the ‘hard core of 
criminal law’ and other types of criminal law, thereby creating two subcategories of 
‘criminal charges’.259 Unlike criminal cases belonging to the hard core of criminal 
law, the Court argues there are ‘criminal cases which do not carry any significant 
degree of stigma’, that is, ‘“criminal charges” of differing weight’.260 The latter in-
clude, for instance, administrative penalties in the field of customs law and compe-
tition law, and ‘penalties imposed by a court with jurisdiction in financial matters’.261 
Hence, this Jussila distinction seems particularly relevant for the three areas of EU 
administrative criminal law this contribution focuses on. 
We will come back to the relevance of this distinction when looking into the safe-
guards that apply to EU administrative criminal law (infra, Part IV). 
2.  Applicability under EU Law 
The ECtHR’s autonomous definition obviously applies to all EU Member States, 
as they all signed and ratified the ECHR. By contrast, whether it also applies under 
____________ 
258  Cf. Joint partly dissenting opinion Judges Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Mularoni joined 
by Judge Caflisch, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, 
para. 11. The Judges call the extension to the tax field ‘unfortunate’ because it is a ‘specific’ 
field. To support their argument, they refer to the Ferrazzini judgment where the Court 
acknowledged the different nature of tax matters with respect to the civil head of Article 6 
ECHR (para. 4, with reference to ECtHR, Ferrazzini v. Italy, 12 July 2001, para. 29). Could 
the same argument also be made for other fields? 
259  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 43. 
260  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 43. Admit-
tedly, this distinction does not entirely come out of the blue. In fact, as early as the Öztürk 
case, the Court acknowledged that there were minor criminal offences which were ‘hardly 
likely to harm the reputation of the offender’. ECtHR (Plenary), Öztürk v. Germany, 21 Feb-
ruary 1984, para. 53. The difference is that the Court now explicitly makes this distinction 
and attaches procedural consequences to this distinction. 
261  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 43. Admit-
tedly, this distinction does not entirely come out of the blue. In fact, as early as the Öztürk 
case, the Court acknowledged that there were minor criminal offences which were ‘hardly 
likely to harm the reputation of the offender’. ECtHR (Plenary), Öztürk v. Germany, 21 Feb-
ruary 1984, para. 53. The difference is that the Court now explicitly makes this distinction 
and attaches procedural consequences to this distinction. 
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EU law, is much less evident. As long as the EU has not acceded to the ECHR,262 
neither the Union nor its institutions and authorities are, formally speaking, bound 
by the ECHR. Nevertheless, in practice, the case law of the ECtHR already has a 
significant impact on EU institutions and authorities, also due to the fact that they 
are obliged to comply with the EU Charter, which offers the same protection as the 
ECHR and, in some cases, even a higher level of protection.263 Indeed, Article 52(3) 
of the EU Charter sets out that: 
[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. 
This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection. 
In its case law, the CJEU is clearly influenced by the case law of the ECtHR. In 
some cases, it even explicitly refers to the Engel criteria;264 in others, it prefers to 
stick to its own interpretation of those criteria.265  
At the same time, it is important to highlight that the constitutional framework of 
the EU imposes important limitations on the margin of interpretation of the CJEU. 
Indeed, the term ‘criminal’ in the TFEU does not have the same broad meaning as 
under the ECHR but refers to the national qualification used by Member States.266 
Therefore, when it comes to defining the competences of the EU in the field of crim-
inal law, the national label still prevails.  
To conclude, the case law of the ECtHR undoubtedly has an impact in areas where 
the EU institutions themselves have the authority to impose ‘administrative’ sanc-
tions. EU institutions and authorities must ensure that the ‘accused’ effectively en-
joys the ‘criminal’ rights enshrined in the EU Charter, interpreted in light of the case 
law of the ECtHR. Nonetheless, the fact that a charge or offence is considered ‘crim-
inal’ under the Convention does not imply that all EU rules on criminal procedure 
____________ 
262  After the CJEU handed down its critical opinion on the accession to the ECHR (Opin-
ion 2/2013 of 18 December 2014), the accession negotiations between the EU and the Coun-
cil of Europe ended up on a side-track. For a current state of affairs, see P. Tacik, ‘After the 
Dust Has Settled: How to Construct the New Accession after Opinion 2/2013 of the CJEU’, 
18 German L.J. 919 (2017). For some thoughts on the way forward, see T. Lock, ‘The Future 
of the European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after 
Opinion 2/13: Is It Still Possible and Is It Still Desirable?’, 11 EUConst 239 (2015). 
263  See also P. Caeiro, ‘The influence of the EU on the “blurring” between administrative 
and criminal law’, in: F. Galli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Do labels still matter? Blurring 
boundaries between administrative and criminal law, The Influence of the EU, Brussels, 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014, at 182. 
264  Case C-489/10 (Grand Chamber), Bonda, 5 June 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:319, § 37. 
265  Case C-617/10 (Grand Chamber), Åklagaren v. Åkerberg Fransson, 26 February 
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, where the Court deliberately referred to the ‘Bonda criteria’. 
266  See e.g. Case C-60/12, Baláž, 14 November 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:733. For a further 
analysis, see V. Franssen, ‘La notion ‘pénale’: mot magique ou critère trompeur? Réflexions 
sur les distinctions entre le droit pénal et le droit quasi pénal’, in: D. Brach-Thiel (ed.), 
Existe-t-il un seul non bis in idem aujourd’hui?, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2017, at 89 et seq. 
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would all of a sudden become applicable. The EU qualification as administrative 
thus remains relevant. The crucial question will therefore be to what extent it remains 
relevant or, put differently, to what extent the substantive and procedural safeguards 
applicable to ‘criminal’ penalties could apply differently or less strictly to punitive 
administrative penalties (infra, Part IV). 
In the subsequent sections we will examine whether the sanctions applicable in the 
field of EU competition law, EU banking law, and EU market abuse are of a criminal 
nature. It is important to stress from the outset that the analysis below is largely a 
theoretical assessment in light of the criteria applied by the ECtHR267 —unless there 
is relevant case law on the issue—and thus remains a provisional assessment which, 
in the future, might be invalidated by the ECtHR (or the CJEU) in a concrete case. 
As illustrated above, under the umbrella of the three Engel criteria, the Court in re-
ality applies a whole array of different elements to determine the criminal nature of 
a charge, an offence, or a penalty. Which element weighs most tends to fluctuate 
because the Court may consider any relevant fact or circumstance of a case. This 
explains why, despite the Court’s efforts to further clarify the Engel criteria, the out-
come of the Court’s assessment in an individual case often remains uncertain.268 
B.  EU Competition Law 
1.  Introduction 
We learnt from the analysis in Part II that the principal sanction in cartel cases is 
a fine. This sanction is nearly always combined with a cease and desist order (or 
prohibition decision) based on Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003 and could be com-
bined with a periodic penalty payment pursuant to Article 24(1) of Regulation 
No 1/2003. Furthermore, the sanctioning decisions of the European Commission are 
promptly announced by a press release and followed by the publication of a summary 
decision in the Official Journal as well as a non-official, non-confidential but still 
very comprehensive version of the decision on the Commission’s website. In what 
follows, we will examine the true nature of these sanctions and measures, in the light 
of the existing case law and some of the Engel criteria discussed above. 
____________ 
267  We will, however, not consider the sub-criterion on the similarity between the admin-
istrative procedure and the national criminal procedure, as this would require, on the one 
hand, an analysis of the applicable administrative procedural rules and, on the other, a com-
parison to national criminal procedure—which still varies substantially from one Member 
State to another.  
268  See also A. Weyembergh and N. Joncheray, ‘Punitive Administrative Sanctions and 
Procedural Safeguards. A Blurred Picture that Needs to be Addressed’, 7 NJECL 189 (2016), 
at 196–197. 
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2.  Cartel Fines 
Article 23(5) of Regulation No 1/2003 states explicitly that decisions imposing 
fines for a violation of Articles 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102 
of the TFEU) ‘shall not be of a criminal law nature’. Nonetheless, as we will explain 
below, there are important reasons to believe that, despite the label used by the EU 
legislator, cartel fines are punitive and qualify as criminal sanctions under Articles 6 
and 7 of the ECHR. To that effect, we will first analyse the sanctioning goals of the 
fines put forward by the European Commission and, second, examine the existing 
case law of the EU Courts and the ECtHR.  
–  Sanctioning Goals 
The primary goal of sanctioning undertakings for cartel offences is definitely de-
terrence. But in addition to deterrence there are also many indications of a retributive 
or punitive concern in EU competition law, especially with regard to so-called ‘hard 
core’ cartels. This double sanctioning goal can be substantiated in several ways.  
For a start, the deterrence goal is explicitly laid down in the 2006 Guidelines on 
Fines:  
Fines should have a sufficiently deterrent effect, not only in order to sanction the under-
takings concerned (specific deterrence) but also in order to deter other undertakings from 
engaging in, or continuing, behaviour that is contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty (general deterrence).269 
Deterrence, in combination with retributive denunciation,270 is also expressed by 
the ‘tough-on-crime’ language of the European Commission in its policy documents 
and press releases announcing the fines imposed in cartel cases and the increasingly 
severe fines for cartels since the publication of the first Guidelines on Fines in 1998.  
The EU Courts (see also infra) have explicitly recognized that the fines imposed 
for cartels do ‘not only [pursue] a preventive, but also a punitive objective’.271 This 
____________ 
269  Point 4 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines, emphasis added. 
270  The term ‘retributive denunciation’ refers to a particular theory of retribution which 
is, in our view, particularly fit for legal persons: under this theory, retributive punishment 
does not just express moral disapproval but more generally strong social disapproval of the 
offender and his behaviour. In a way, retributive denunciation is quite similar to consequen-
tialist denunciation, the main difference being that the former focuses more on the offender 
and his past behaviour, whereas the latter is more concerned about the beneficial, educative 
consequences of punishment. Both versions of denunciation, however, highlight the expres-
sive function of criminal law and punishment. This expressive (or symbolic) function of 
criminal sanctions is precisely what distinguishes them from administrative or civil sanc-
tions. For a further analysis, see V. Franssen, European Sentencing Principles for Corpora-
tions, doctoral dissertation, Leuven, KU Leuven, 2013, at 254–260. 
271  Case T-410/09, Almamet GmbH v. Commission, 12 December 2012, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:676, para. 271, emphasis added, with reference to Case T-279/02, De-
gussa v. Commission (2006). See also F. Castillo de la Torre, ‘The 2006 Guidelines on Fines: 
Reflections on the Commission’s Practice’, 33 World Competition 359 (2010), at 360–361, 
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punitive objective explains why fines for participating in a cartel ‘cannot be set at a 
level which merely negates the profits of the cartel’.272 
Furthermore, turning to the 2006 Guidelines on Fines, one will recognize, on the 
one hand, that many of the sanctioning factors in the Guidelines on Fines are based 
on an economic logic and translate the Commission’s objective to achieve general 
and/or special deterrence, such as the value of sales being the basis for the calculation 
of the fine, the entry fee, and the possibility of a gains-based and turnover-based 
increase.273 On the other hand, those guidelines contain a number of elements which 
are typical of criminal sentencing and retributive justice.274 At the time of their pub-
lication, the European Commission highlighted that ‘fines should not only punish 
past behaviour, but also that their level will deter that particular company, or any 
other, from entering into illegal behaviour in the future’.275 The fines calculated on 
the basis of the 2006 Guidelines are thus meant to be both backward-looking and 
forward-looking.  
For instance, with respect to the basic amount of the fine, the gravity of the in-
fringement is not only determined in function of economic criteria but also by the 
‘nature of the infringement’ and ‘whether or not the infringement has been imple-
mented’.276 By taking into account whether the infringement is implemented or not 
to determine the gravity of the infringement, the Guidelines show that even non-
implemented agreements (comparable to inchoate offences or attempt), which have 
not caused any concrete harm yet, deserve to be punished—abstract harmfulness thus 
suffices.  
Some authors argue that even the ‘entry fee’ is not exclusively based on deterrence 
because it has nothing to do with the costs of criminal behaviour.277 It is also telling 
____________ 
with reference to Case C-289/04 P, Showa Denko v. Commission [2006]; I. Simonsson, Le-
gitimacy in EU Cartel Control, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, at 276 and the case law ref-
erences there. 
272  Case T-410/09, Almamet GmbH v. Commission, 12 December 2012, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:676, para. 271, with reference to Case T-59/02 Archer Daniels Midland v. 
Commission (2006). 
273  For a more extensive analysis of those deterrent sanctioning criteria, see V. Franssen, 
European Sentencing Principles for Corporations, doctoral dissertation, Leuven, KU Leu-
ven, 2013, at 321–324. 
274  See also C. Harding and J. Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010 (2nd ed.), 327 and 329; I. Simonsson, Legitimacy in EU Cartel Con-
trol, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 304–305. 
275  European Commission, Competition: Commission revises Guidelines for setting fines 
in antitrust cases, press release, 28 June 2006, emphasis added. 
276  Point 22 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines. 
277  Cf. I. Simonsson, Legitimacy in EU Cartel Control, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 
305 (‘Entrance fees [sic] have no apparent relation to the costs to society of cartel activity’.). 
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that in practice the percentage of the value of sales used for the entry fee is usually 
identical to the percentage reflecting the gravity of the infringement.278 
Furthermore, some ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating circumstances’ in the Guidelines 
relate to the degree of culpability of the offender. For instance, the undertaking which 
took a leading role in the agreement or instigated others to form a cartel could face a 
higher fine.279 Conversely, if the undertaking’s involvement was ‘substantially lim-
ited’, it may receive a lighter fine.280 Other authors have argued that the increase for 
repeat offenders is a retributive element.281 More in general, as argued before, the 
secrecy of hard core cartels also points to the culpability of the offender, character-
izing the offensive nature of their behaviour.282 
Finally, the Guidelines include the possibility to impose a ‘symbolic fine’ in ‘cer-
tain cases’.283 Depending on the concrete circumstances, this message can be of a 
retributive nature, communicating social disapproval, or of consequentialist nature, 
as a warning to other potential offenders (general deterrence or educative pur-
pose).284 
____________ 
278  See e.g. European Commission, Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC 
Treaty and Article 53 EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38.695 – Sodium Chlorate), C(2008) 
2626 final, 11 June 2008, recitals 521 and 523 (19%); European Commission, Decision re-
lating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC Treaty and Article 53 EEA Agreement (Case 
COMP/39.396 – Calcium Carbide and Magnesium), C(2009) 5791 final, 22 July 2009, re-
citals 301 and 306 (17%); European Commission, Decision relating to a proceeding under 
Article 81 EC Treaty and Article 53 EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.129 – Power Trans-
formers), C(2009) 7601 final, 7 October 2009, recitals 247 and 251 (16%); European Com-
mission, Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 EEA 
Agreement (Case COMP/38.866 – Animal Feed Phosphates), 20 July 2010, recitals 205 and 
210 (17%). 
279  Point 28 third indent of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines. 
280  Point 29 third indent of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines. 
281  I. Simonsson, Legitimacy in EU Cartel Control, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, at 
305. 
282  See Point 23 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines, emphasis added (‘horizontal price-fix-
ing, market-sharing and output-limitations, which are usually secret, are by their very nature, 
among the most harmful restrictions of competition’.). 
283  Point 36 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines. The 2006 Guidelines on Fines do not further 
define the cases in which the Commission can impose such a symbolic fine, which suggests 
that it has ample discretion in this respect, as long as it gives a justification for doing so. 
284  For instance, in the organic peroxides cartel the Commission imposed a symbolic fine 
of €1,000 (Point 5(d) 1998 Guidelines on Fines) on AC-Treuhand because it was the first 
time that the Commission held a consultancy firm liable for being involved in a cartel. See 
European Commission, Decision C(2003)4570 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC 
Treaty and Article 53 EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E.2/37.857 – Organic Peroxides), 10 
December 2003, recital 454. This fine was not contested in the proceedings before the Court 
of First Instance: Case T-99/04, AC-Treuhand AG v. Commission, 8 July 2008, 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:256, para. 155. For a more in-depth analysis of the nature of the AC Treu-
hand’s liability, see C. Harding, Capturing the Cartel’s Friends: Cartel Facilitation and the 
Idea of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 34 E.L. Rev. 298 (2009). 
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–  Further Analysis in the Light of Other Engel Criteria 
The purpose of cartel fines being clearly both punitive and deterrent, this is already 
a strong indication of their criminal nature in the meaning of Articles 6 and 7 of the 
ECHR. When looking at some of the other Engel (sub-)criteria, this impression is 
confirmed. 
First, the prohibition against cartel is a generally applicable rule and the fines are 
inflicted by a public authority with statutory powers of enforcement. 
Second, as also pointed out, fines can only be imposed if the Commission proves 
the undertaking knowingly participated in the cartel. Any doubt about the existence 
of the infringement (involving both actus reus and mens rea) must benefit the under-
taking.285 
Third, one may add to that the maximum fine of ten per cent of the undertaking’s 
total turnover is substantial and, in some cases, may even threaten the undertaking 
with insolvency.286 Moreover, in practice, the fines imposed by the European Com-
mission are quite severe and clearly of a different level than the ones that have been 
imposed so far by the ECB in the area of EU banking law. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that some authors argue that the ‘[a]ntitrust proceedings 
brought by the Commission (…) may culminate in non-negligible stigma for the le-
gal or natural persons involved’.287 
–  Criminal Nature Confirmed by the Courts? 
●  EU Courts 
Considering the wording of Article 23(5) of Regulation No 1/2003, it is quite un-
derstandable that the EU Courts are rather reluctant to admit that EU fines for cartels 
are ‘criminal’ in nature.288 Nevertheless, an analysis of the Courts’ case law reveals 
a growing awareness over the past few decades that those fines are in fact of a crim-
inal nature, in particular because the Courts apply the case law of their counterpart 
____________ 
285  See A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 115 and the case law references mentioned there. 
286  For a further analysis on the role the insolvency risk (or inability to pay) plays in the 
setting of the fine in cartel cases, see V. Franssen, European Sentencing Principles for Cor-
porations, doctoral dissertation, Leuven, KU Leuven, 2013, at 359–364. 
287  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2016 (6th ed.), at 115. 
288  By contrast, some Advocates General of the CJEU have been more explicit on this 
issue. For instance, Advocates General Vesterdorf and Leger both took the view that EU 
competition law involves a criminal charge in the meaning of Article 6. Advocate General 
Kokott argued that the Court of Justice should closely conform to the case law of the ECtHR 
even though Article 6(1) of the ECHR does not directly apply to the proceedings before the 
European Commission. See A. Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement and Human 
Rights, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2008, at 26–27 and the references men-
tioned there. 
54 Franssen/Vandeweerd  
in Strasbourg, the ECtHR, regarding the criminal prong of Article 6 of the ECHR. It 
is indeed the case law on the applicable substantive and procedural safeguards in EU 
competition law through which the criminal nature of this area of EU administrative 
law becomes apparent.  
For instance, in the sodium chlorate cartel, the Court of Justice ruled on the ap-
plicability of the presumption of innocence —a fundamental right that only applies 
in criminal matters—, to cartel cases as follows:  
It must also be accepted that, given the nature of the infringements in question and the 
nature and degree of severity of the ensuing penalties, the principle of the presumption of 
innocence applies to the procedures relating to infringements of the competition rules ap-
plicable to undertakings that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty pay-
ments (see, to that effect, in particular the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights of 21 February 1984, Öztürk, Series A No 73, and of 25 August 1987 Lutz, Series 
A No 123-A).289 
Interestingly, the Court referred to both the fines and the periodic penalty pay-
ments that can be imposed in such cases.  
In the same cartel, but against a different undertaking, the General Court ruled as 
follows with respect to the principle of legality:  
According to the case-law, the principle that penalties must be strictly defined by law 
requires that legislation must clearly define offences and the penalties which they attract. 
That condition is satisfied where the individual concerned is in a position, on the basis of 
the relevant provision and if need be with the help of the interpretative assistance given 
by the courts, to know which acts or omissions will make him criminally liable.290 
That being said, even if the criminal nature of EU cartel law and of the sanctions 
that can be imposed is established, this does not necessarily mean that all rights of 
the criminal prong of Article 6 of the ECHR apply to the same extent in EU compe-
tition law. Indeed, as we will further explain in Part IV, the real questions or stakes 
are elsewhere. 
●  ECtHR 
____________ 
289  Case C-199/92 P, Hüls v Commission, 8 July 1999, ECR I-4287, para. 150, emphasis 
added. 
290  Case T-299/08, Elf Aquitaine SA v. Commission, 17 May 2011, ECLI:EU:T:2011:217, 
para. 187, emphasis added. 
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The ECtHR, for its part, has taken a clear stance on the nature of national291 com-
petition law, at least with respect to hard core cartels.292  
In Menarini Diagnostics, the ECtHR indeed ruled that a €6 million fine for price-
fixing and market-sharing (i.e. hard core cartels) is a criminal penalty in the meaning 
of Article 6 of the ECHR.293 The Court based its ruling on a cumulative application 
of three Engel subcriteria: the general character of the rule, the fact that the offence 
concerns the general interests of society which are normally protected by the criminal 
law, as well as the punitive and preventive purpose of the fine.294 
While some authors draw far-reaching conclusions from the above case,295 we be-
lieve it is important to emphasize that the ECtHR concluded in other, earlier compe-
tition law cases, which also involved concerted practices and the restriction of com-
petition but not hard core cartels, that the charges were not criminal in the meaning 
of Article 6 of the ECHR. These cases are, in our view, equally interesting as 
Menarini Diagnostics, because they enable us to better understand what parts of 
competition law are criminal in nature and why. For instance, in OOO Neste St. Pe-
tersburg and Others v. Russia, the Court stressed that:  
the Convention case-law, including the cases invoked by the applicant companies [e.g. 
Stenuit v. France], does not contain an explicit conclusion that competition law offences 
should be regarded as ‘criminal’ within the meaning of Article 6.  
____________ 
291  The ECtHR has not yet ruled on the nature of EU competition law. As long as the EU 
has not acceded to the ECHR (supra), the ECtHR is unlikely to take any cases on EU com-
petition law. See A. Bailleux, ‘The Fiftieth Shade of Grey. Competition Law, “Criministra-
tive Law” and “Fairly Fair Trials”’, in: F. Galli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Do labels still 
matter? Blurring boundaries between administrative and criminal law, The Influence of the 
EU, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014, at 140 and the references there to 
past cases declared inadmissible by the ECtHR.  
292  Some authors draw more general conclusions from Menarini Diagnostics, arguing that 
‘(European) competition law has a criminal law nature’. See R. Wesseling and M. van der 
Woude, ‘The Lawfulness and Acceptability of Enforcement of European Cartel Law’, 35 
World Competition 573 (2012), 577, emphasis added.  
293  ECtHR, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 27 September 2011, para. 42. To note 
also that the ECtHR assesses the nature of the penalty based on Article 6 of the ECHR, not 
on Article 7 of the ECHR. This shows how much the notion ‘criminal charge’ and ‘penalty’ 
are entwined in the Court’s case law. 
294  ECtHR, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 27 September 2011, paras. 40–41, 
with reference to ECtHR, Stenuit v. France. The Stenuit case is generally considered as the 
first case where a competition case was considered under the criminal limb of Article 6 
ECHR, even though the ECtHR never pronounced/ruled on the merits of the case because 
the case was struck out of the list. See e.g. A. Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement 
and Human Rights, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2008, 25–26.  
295  See e.g. A. Weyembergh and N. Joncheray, ‘Punitive Administrative Sanctions and 
Procedural Safeguards. A Blurred Picture that Needs to be Addressed’, 7 NJECL 189 (2016), 
at 196. 
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The Court hence considers it more appropriate to consider the applicant companies’ in-
dividual situation against the principal criteria defining the notion of ‘criminal’.296 
In that case, the ECtHR rejected the applicants’ argument that the Russian compe-
tition law was a generally applicable rule, because it ‘applies only to “relations which 
influence competition in commodity markets”’.297 Moreover, the sanction imposed 
on the applicant, namely the confiscation of the profit the applicants had gained from 
the infringement, is ‘aimed at prevention of disturbances of competition and its res-
toration if disturbances take place’298 rather than at ‘punishment to deter re-offend-
ing’.299 Furthermore, the Court also observed that: 
certain monopolistic behaviour may even be authorized by the State if proven to serve 
common good. Genuinely criminal behaviour is not usually subject to such utilitarian 
justification. Lastly, freedom of market competition is a relative, situational value and 
encroachments on it are not inherently wrong in themselves.300 
It follows from the foregoing argumentation that anti-competitive behaviour 
which is not unambiguously prohibited does not qualify as criminal. In other words, 
if we translate this to the EU level, not all anti-competitive practices which fall under 
Articles 101–102 of the TFEU will be criminal in the meaning of Article 6 of the 
ECHR. Some agreements can be legal (i.e. pro-competitive) or illegal (i.e. anti-com-
petitive), depending on an ad hoc economic appreciation301 of the European Com-
mission. Such agreements are most likely non-criminal. This is, for instance, the case 
with vertical agreements between undertakings ‘which operate at different levels of 
the production and supply chain’,302 such as selective distribution agreements303 or 
single branding agreements.304 Similarly, not all conduct of an undertaking holding 
____________ 
296  ECtHR, OOO Neste St. Petersburg and Others v. Russia (Dec.), 3 June 2004, at 9 
sub 2, emphasis added. 
297  ECtHR, OOO Neste St. Petersburg and Others v. Russia (Dec.), 3 June 2004, at 10 
sub (b). 
298  ECtHR, OOO Neste St. Petersburg and Others v. Russia (Dec.), 3 June 2004, at 10 
sub (b). 
299  ECtHR, OOO Neste St. Petersburg and Others v. Russia (Dec.), 3 June 2004, at 10 
sub (c).  
300  ECtHR, OOO Neste St. Petersburg and Others v. Russia (Dec.), 3 June 2004, at 10 
sub (b), emphasis added. 
301  On the increased economic approach of the European Commisison and its implica-
tions for evidence gathering and judicial review, see F. Castillo de la Torre and E.G. Four-
nier, Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in EU Competition Law, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2017, at 416. 
302  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011 (4th ed.), at 629. 
303  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011 (4th ed.), at 667–669. 
304  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011 (4th ed.), at 663–666. 
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a dominant position in a certain market constitutes an abuse in the meaning of Arti-
cle 102 of the TFEU.305 
In sum, in the light of the above case law (even if it applies only to national com-
petition law), one may conclude that fines imposed to punish hard core cartels under 
EU law, which rules are largely mirrored by national law or practice,306 can indeed 
be considered punitive and thus criminal in the meaning of Articles 6 and 7 of the 
ECHR. The same, however, cannot be said for other parts of competition law that 
are mainly aimed at the regulation of competition and the prevention of anti-compet-
itive behaviour. 
3.  Other Sanctions and Measures  
The criminal nature of the other sanctions and measures imposed by the Commis-
sion is less certain. The prohibition order simply aims to put an end to the harmful 
behaviour; the periodic penalty payment simply adds pressure to that order and can 
therefore be considered a simple enforcement measure (cf. EU banking law; infra, 
Part III, B.3.). By contrast, as indicated before, the Commission’s publication strat-
egy with respect to cartels clearly pursues a punitive and deterring objective. 
That being said, if the proceedings leading to the imposition of a fine, which can 
be combined with other sanctions or measures, concern the determination of a ‘crim-
inal charge’ in the meaning of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the criminal safeguards will 
apply to the entire proceedings. Considering the affirmative case law of the ECtHR 
on the criminal nature of cartel fines, there is no need to inquire further: the entire 
investigation and sanctioning phase will have to meet the requirements of the ECHR 
applicable in criminal cases.  
4.  Conclusion 
One may conclude that the fines imposed by the European Commission in cartel 
cases are clearly of a criminal nature, despite the wording of Article 23(5) of Regu-
lation No 1/2003. This has been confirmed by the ECtHR with regard to national 
competition law which, as we know, highly resembles the EU rules, and this also 
transpires from the EU Courts’ case law. The nature of the other sanctions and 
measures is not necessarily criminal, but since they can be imposed together with a 
____________ 
305  For an extensive overview of the many types of agreements which can be an abuse of 
dominant position, see A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Ma-
terials, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011 (4th ed.), at 357–557. 
306  Indeed, while the enforcement of competition law has been strongly decentralized 
since Regulation No 1/2003, domestic sanctioning powers are governed by EU law princi-
ples. As a result, ‘domestic sanctioning powers have been subject to a process of conver-
gence’. M.J. Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law: Principles and Practices, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2014, at 243.  
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(criminal) fine, they have to meet the same level of protection, at least as far as pro-
cedural safeguards are concerned.307  
C.  EU Banking Law 
1.  Introduction 
As explained above, the ECB and the SRB are given significant sanctioning pow-
ers when it comes to supervising the banking system. Both authorities are entitled to 
impose administrative sanctions on credit institutions and other supervised entities. 
However, are those sanctions of a criminal nature in the meaning of Articles 6 and 7 
of the ECHR? To answer this question, we will successively review the different 
sanctions analysed in Part II. 
2.  Administrative Pecuniary Penalties and Fines 
Pursuant to Article 18(1) and (7) of the SSM Regulation, the ECB may impose 
administrative pecuniary penalties or fines upon credit institutions and other super-
vised entities which committed, intentionally or negligently, a breach of relevant di-
rectly applicable acts of EU law or of ECB regulations or decisions. These penalties 
are qualified as ‘administrative’ pursuant to Article 120 of the SSM Framework Reg-
ulation, and thus the first Engel criterion is, once more, of little use. Therefore, we 
need to move on to the other two criteria: the nature of the offence and the type and 
degree of severity of the penalty.  
Considering the above case law of the ECtHR, one could argue that the adminis-
trative penalties under Article 18(1) and (7) of the SSM Regulation are ‘criminal’ in 
nature for the following reasons: 
– the legal rule to be observed has a generally binding character—at least in the 
hypothesis of Article 18(1) of the SSM Regulation; 
– the penalties are adopted by a public authority with statutory powers of enforce-
ment, namely the ECB—admittedly, this subcriterion is probably not preponderant; 
– the penalties can only be imposed if the infringement was committed intention-
ally or negligently, in other words, they require the finding of guilt; 
____________ 
307  The substantive requirements (e.g. principle of legality) might be somewhat less high: 
Article 7 of the ECHR, for instance, only applies to (criminal) penalties, not to measures, 
even if those measures are imposed in the context of a criminal proceeding. 
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– as to their goal, the penalties aim at effectively punishing and dissuading, or 
even deterring, the supervised entities in case of an infringement of prudential re-
quirements,308 they are thus administered for past behaviour and to prevent future 
wrongdoing; 
– furthermore, the maximum penalty the supervised entity risks is substantial: up to 
ten per cent of the entity’s total annual turnover of the preceding business year—
this is the same maximum as under EU competition law (supra, Part II, B.2.)—or 
twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided thanks to the infringement. 
This maximum indicates the objective is not merely to disgorge the profits made 
by the entity. Admittedly, the fines and pecuniary penalties imposed so far by the 
ECB still appear (relatively) modest and are probably309 quite far from the ceiling 
of ten per cent, but following the case law of the ECtHR in other areas, the actual 
penalty ‘cannot diminish the importance of what was initially at stake’.310  
Next to that, the SRB too may impose fines on credit institutions if it finds that 
such entity has committed one of the infringements listed in Article 38 of the SRM 
Regulation, which basically constitute forms of ‘obstruction of justice’ (supra, Part 
II, C.3.). These fines are explicitly qualified as ‘administrative’ pursuant to Arti-
cle 41(2) of the SRM Regulation. Yet, as to the nature of the infringement, the un-
derlying legal rule (cooperation with the SRB’s investigative measures and compli-
ance with its decisions) is generally applicable to all supervised entities, a fine can 
only be imposed if the infringement was committed intentionally or negligently, it is 
applied by a public authority with statutory powers of enforcement, and it seems to 
have a punitive and dissuading purpose. Moreover, the rule that, in case an act or 
omission constitutes more than one infringement, only the higher fine will apply, 
definitely reminds us of sentencing rules on the concurrence of offences under crim-
inal law. Considering all these elements, one may conclude that the fine is of a ‘crim-
inal’ nature in the meaning of Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR. That being said, with 
regard to the third Engel criterion, the maximum amount of the fine is substantially 
lower (one per cent of the entity’s total annual turnover, and at least equal to the 
financial benefit obtained from the infringement) than the pecuniary penalties that 
____________ 
308  S. Allegrezza and I. Rodopoulos, ‘Enforcing Prudential Banking Regulations in the 
Eurozone: A Reading from the Viewpoint of Criminal Law’, in: K. Ligeti and V. Franssen 
(eds.), Challenges in the Field of Economic and Financial Crime in Europe and the US, 
Oxford/Portland, Hart, at 250–251; L. Wissink, T. Duijkersloot, and R. Widdershoven, 
‘Shifts in Competences between Member States and the EU in the New Supervisory System 
for Credit Institutions and their Consequences for Judicial Protection’, 10 Utrecht Law Re-
view 92 (2014), at 112. 
309  As indicated before, the ECB provides very limited information about the calculation 
of the fine. Therefore, to know how much the maximum fine was in each case, one would 
have to consult the annual accounting reports of the financial institutions that have been 
sanctioned. 
310  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Ezeh and Connors v. United Kingdom, 9 October 2003, 
para. 120. See e.g. also ECtHR, Tomasovic v. Croatia, 18 October 2011, para. 23. 
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can be imposed by the ECB (supra, Part II, C.2.); therefore, the punishment is clearly 
less severe, which might raise some doubts about the criminal nature of the fine. 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has ruled in several cases that the lack of severity of the 
penalty at stake does not deprive an offence of its criminal nature. In other words, 
when other elements suggest the offence is criminal in nature, a penalty of a rela-
tively low degree of severity will not be able to change this.311 
In conclusion, the administrative pecuniary penalties and fines imposed by the 
ECB and the SRB could be considered to be of a criminal nature,312 even if the as-
sessment is slightly more affirmative for the ECB sanctions than for the SRB fines. 
This implies that when imposing sanctions under the SSM and the SRM regulations, 
both authorities (but definitely the ECB) will have to respect criminal law safeguards 
guaranteed under the ECHR and the EU Charter (infra, Part IV). 
3.  Periodic Penalty Payments 
Pursuant to Article 18(7) of the SSM Regulation, the ECB may also impose peri-
odic penalty payments in accordance with Regulation No 2532/98313 in case of a 
breach of ECB regulations or decisions. Similarly, the SRB is empowered to impose 
periodic penalty payments upon credit institutions in order to compel them to comply 
with resolution rules pursuant to Article 39 of the SRM Regulation. 
The criminal nature of these penalties is less straightforward than for administra-
tive pecuniary penalties and fines described above. This is eventually due to the fact 
that they are periodic and aim at compelling the supervised entity to stop the infringe-
ment. In this respect, it is interesting to refer to the ECB’s Supervisory Manual pub-
lished in March 2018: 
Among the powers granted to the ECB by the SSM Regulation, the imposition of periodic 
penalty payments can be considered as an enforcement measure. Periodic penalty pay-
ments are not intended to punish or deter the entity/person concerned. They are applied 
____________ 
311  See e.g. ECtHR (Plenary), Öztürk v. Germany, 21 February 1984, para. 54 (‘The rel-
ative lack of seriousness of the penalty at stake (…) cannot divest an offence of its inherently 
criminal character’.); ECtHR, Lauko v. Slovakia, 2 September 1998, para. 58; ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 35, emphasis added (‘No 
established or authoritative basis has therefore emerged in the case-law for holding that the 
minor nature of the penalty, in taxation proceedings or otherwise, may be decisive in re-
moving an offence, otherwise criminal by nature, from the scope of Article 6’.) and para. 38. 
Contra: ECtHR, Morel v. France (Dec.), 3 June 2003, at 3–4. 
312  B. van Bockel, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation: Questions of ne bis 
in idem and implications for the further integration of the system of fundamental rights pro-
tection in the EU’, 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 194 (2017), 
at 212.  
313  Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of 
the European Central Bank to impose sanctions.  
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when the infringement is still ongoing, with a view to compelling the entity/person con-
cerned to comply with the obligation which is being breached.314  
Whether periodic penalty payments can be considered punitive and thus ‘criminal’ 
in the meaning of Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR remains disputed. While some schol-
ars hold that periodic penalty payments do not aim at deterring or punishing but ra-
ther at putting an end to a prohibited conduct315 and, as a consequence, cannot be 
considered ‘criminal’, others argue that the mere fact that a penalty aims at compel-
ling entities to comply with legal rules does not necessarily exclude its punitive char-
acter.316 In addition, in support of the punitive nature of such penalties, attention 
should be paid to Regulation No 2015/159 of 27 January 2015,317 which amended 
Regulation No 2532/98 and defined a periodic penalty payment as an amount of 
money that a supervised entity is obliged to pay ‘as a punishment or with a view to 
forcing the persons concerned to comply with the ECB supervisory regulations and 
decisions’.318 Was this only a slip of the pen, or did the EU legislator indeed want to 
confirm the punitive nature of the periodic penalty payment, at least when imposed 
by the ECB?319  
In the end, though, there is perhaps no need to answer the difficult question on the 
true nature of periodic penalty payments as they too can be combined with fines (cf. 
EU competition law; supra, Part III, B.3.)—fines that are without any doubt of a 
criminal nature—meaning that the procedure will in any event have to meet the min-
imum standards of the criminal limb of Article 6 of the ECHR. 
4.  Publication of ECB and SRB Sanctioning Decisions 
Pursuant to Article 18(6) of the SSM Regulation, Article 132(1) of the SSM 
Framework Regulation and Article 41 of the SRM Regulation, the ECB and the SRB 
____________ 
314  ECB, SSM Supervisory Manual. European banking supervision: functioning of the 
SSM and supervisory approach, March 2018, at 100, emphasis added, available at: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.supervisoryman-
ual201803.en.pdf?1584b27046baf1e68f92f82caadb3a63 (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
315  L. Wissink, T. Duijkersloot, and R. Widdershoven, ‘Shifts in Competences between 
Member States and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and their 
Consequences for Judicial Protection’, 10 Utrecht Law Review 92 (2014), at 113. 
316  S. Allegrezza and I. Rodopoulos, ‘Enforcing Prudential Banking Regulations in the 
Eurozone: A Reading from the Viewpoint of Criminal Law’, in: K. Ligeti and V. Franssen 
(eds.), Challenges in the Field of Economic and Financial Crime in Europe and the US, 
Oxford/Portland, Hart, at 252. 
317  Council Regulation (EU) No 2015/159 of 27 January 2015 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 2532/98 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions, OJ L 
27, 3 February 2015, at 1.  
318  Article 1(6) of Regulation No 2532/98, emphasis added. 
319  Indeed, to recall, the EU legislator did not make such amendment with respect to the 
periodic penalty payments that can be imposed by the SRB (supra, Part II, C.3.). 
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must publish their decisions regarding the administrative penalties they impose on 
their respective websites.  
As mentioned above, this publication measure could be considered as having a 
punitive character because it may be used as a ‘naming and shaming’ enforcement 
tool to deter supervised entities from committing infringements.320 In this respect, it 
is useful to refer to Dubus S.A. v. France, in which the ECtHR ruled that even a 
blaming sanction like the official warning issued by the French Commission 
bancaire against a credit institution which was not complying with the minimum 
capital and liquidity requirements has a criminal ‘colour’, especially when other, 
more severe sanctions could be imposed too (such as the withdrawal of the banking 
licence or a pecuniary sanction) and considering that the warning had had a financial 
impact on the credit institution.321 
Still, considering the extremely minimalistic style of the ECB’s publications so 
far, it is probably premature to conclude that the publication is criminal in nature. 
The nature of the publication of the decision is also disputed among scholars as some 
argue that it is not a separate penalty but rather a means of informing the financial 
markets and the public in general.322 This objective clearly transpires in some publi-
cations of the ECB, particularly when the liquidity of the supervised entity might be 
at stake, as one can tell from the ECB decision regarding Permanent tsb Group Hold-
ings plc (supra, Part II, C.2.). In addition, other scholars raise the question as to 
whether the possibility to anonymize the publication323 could potentially exclude the 
punitive character of such publication.324 
5.  Conclusion 
In sum, in the light of the above observations, we may come to the conclusion that 
administrative pecuniary penalties and fines imposed by the ECB and the SRB to 
punish and deter banks in case of an infringement can be considered punitive and 
thus ‘criminal’ in the meaning of Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR. 
By contrast, the same conclusion cannot be reached as easily for periodic penalty 
payments which are not intended to punish or deter the supervised entity concerned 
____________ 
320  S. Allegrezza and O. Voordeckers, ‘Investigative and Sanctioning Powers of the ECB 
in the Framework of the Single Monetary Mechanism, Mapping the Complexity of a New 
Enforcement Model’, 4 eucrim 151 (2015), at 157–158. 
321  ECtHR, Dubus S.A. v. France, 11 June 2009, paras. 37–38. 
322  L. Wissink, T. Duijkersloot, and R. Widdershoven, ‘Shifts in Competences between 
Member States and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and their 
Consequences for Judicial Protection’, 10 Utrecht Law Review 92 (2014), at 112. 
323  Article 132(1)(a) of the SSM Framework Regulation, Article 1a(3) of Regulation 
No 2532/98, and Article 41 of the SRM Regulation. 
324  P. Bloch, ‘Les sanctions bancaires et financières au sein de l’Union européenne’, 4 
Revue internationale des services financiers 92 (2015), at 98. 
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but rather to compel that person to comply with the obligation which is being 
breached. Still, to the extent that those periodic penalty payments can be combined 
with a fine, the proceedings leading to such sanctions will in any event have to meet 
the criminal standards of Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR. 
Similarly, the conclusion for the publication of the decision tends to be negative: 
this measure is probably most aimed at informing the financial markets and the gen-
eral public. But considering that it accompanies a criminal pecuniary sanction, it is 
nonetheless likely to have a criminal colour too. 
D.  EU Market Abuse 
1.  Introduction 
As analysed in Part II, the EU legal framework on market abuse contains both 
administrative and criminal sanctions. These sanctions are imposed by national com-
petent (administrative or judicial) authorities and are, contrary to the other two fields 
of EU administrative law, applicable to both natural and legal persons. Our focus in 
this part will be on the administrative sanctions, as there is no doubt whatsoever 
about the criminal nature of the sanctions under the 2014 MAD, which are labelled 
‘criminal’ by the EU legislator (cf. the first Engel criterion).  
2.  Administrative Sanctions and Measures 
The administrative sanctions set forth by the MAR are quite diverse, ranging from 
a simple warning to a temporary or permanent professional ban and withdrawal of 
the legal person’s authorization, to maximum pecuniary sanctions of at least €5 mil-
lion for the most severe infringements committed by natural persons and at least €15 
million or 15 per cent of the total turnover of the legal person. In order to assess the 
potential criminal nature of these sanctions, we need to consider, on the one hand, 
the nature of the infringement and, on the other, the type and degree of severity of 
the penalty the person concerned risks incurring. Rather than starting from scratch, 
we can rely on some existing case law from the ECtHR and the CJEU. In recent 
years, the Courts have indeed had the possibility to rule on national market abuse 
legislation, even if these rules under scrutiny predated the new EU legal framework. 
In particular, the Court has done so in Grande Stevens v. Italy.325 In this case, three 
natural persons and two companies had been punished by the CONSOB, the Italian 
authority which has the task of protecting investors and ensuring the transparency 
and development of the stock markets, for market manipulation, as they had been 
disseminating false or misleading information by not communicating publicly about 
____________ 
325  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014. 
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the ongoing negotiations to amend an equity swap contract. The fines imposed 
ranged from €500,000 to €3 million, and in addition to an administrative fine, the 
natural persons were also banned from administering, managing or supervising listed 
companies for a period of two to four months.  
With respect to the nature of the offence, the Court first of all held that the provi-
sions the applicants had breached ‘were intended to guarantee the integrity of the 
financial markets and to maintain public confidence in the security of transactions’ 
and that these are ‘general interests of society, usually protected by criminal law’. 
Interestingly, the Court made a reference to its case law on national competition law 
in this respect, mentioned earlier in the contribution.326  
Second, the Court considered the purpose of the sanctions, ruling that: 
the fines imposed were essentially intended to punish, in order to prevent repeat offending. 
They had therefore been based on rules whose purpose was both deterrent, namely to 
dissuade the applicants from resuming the activity in question, and punitive, since they 
punished unlawful conduct (…) Thus, they were not solely intended, as the Government 
claimed (see paragraph 91 above), to repair damage of a financial nature. In this respect, 
it should be noted that the penalties were imposed by the CONSOB on the basis of the 
gravity of the impugned conduct, and not of the harm caused to investors.327 
In respect of the nature and severity of the penalty, the Court started by giving an 
overview of the maximum penalties the CONSOB could have imposed. While it 
noted that ‘the fines in question could not be replaced by a custodial sentence in the 
event of non-payment’, it stressed that the maximum fine was €5 million and that 
‘this ordinary maximum amount could, in certain circumstances, be tripled or fixed 
at ten times the proceeds or profit obtained through the unlawful conduct’.328 Fur-
thermore, the Court observed that: 
[i]mposition of the above-mentioned pecuniary administrative sanctions entails the tem-
porary loss of their honour for the representatives of the companies involved, and, if the 
latter are listed on the stock exchange, their representatives are temporarily forbidden 
from administering, managing or supervising listed companies for periods ranging from 
two months to three years. The CONSOB may also prohibit listed companies, manage-
ment companies and auditing companies from engaging the services of the offender, for 
a maximum period of three years, and request professional associations to suspend, on a 
temporary basis, the individual’s right to carry out his or her professional activity (…). 
Lastly, the imposition of financial administrative sanctions entails confiscation of the pro-
ceeds or profits of the unlawful conduct and of the assets which made it possible (…).329 
One will recognize in the above quote quite a few of the administrative sanctions 
that are laid down in the MAR and thus the comparison is easy to make. Admittedly, 
____________ 
326  In particular: ECtHR, Société Stenuit v. France, 30 May 1991, and ECtHR, 
A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, 27 September 2011. 
327  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014, para. 96, emphasis added. 
328  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014, para. 97. 
329  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014, para. 97, emphasis added. 
 EU Administrative Criminal Law 65 
in the case at hand, the eventually imposed sanctions were (well) below the maxi-
mum and some sanctions were not imposed at all. But the actual fines were still of 
‘undeniable severity and had significant financial implications for the applicants’.330 
As for the professional bans imposed on the natural persons, ranging from two to 
four months, they were ‘such as to compromise the integrity of the persons con-
cerned’.331 
Compared to the administrative sanctions the Italian authority could impose in 
2005 and that were considered criminal in nature by the ECtHR,332 the ones put in 
place by the MAR are even more severe: for instance, the fines for legal persons can 
increase up to €15 million or 15 per cent of the legal person’s turnover, and the pro-
fessional bans can even be permanent. Therefore, one can only conclude that they 
are criminal in nature too. 
More recently, the CJEU has also ruled on the criminal nature of administrative 
sanctions in the field of market abuse, but still with respect to national legislation 
predating the MAR and the 2014 MAD. In Garlsson Real Estate SA, the Court held 
that the administrative sanctions under Italian market abuse legislation are of a crim-
inal nature considering the punitive purpose of the administrative penalty and its 
‘high degree of severity’.333 To support this assessment, the Court pointed in partic-
ular to the fact that ‘that penalty may, in certain circumstances, (…) be increased by 
up to 3 times its amount or up to an amount 10 times greater than the proceeds or 
profit obtained from the offence’. which confirms that ‘that penalty is not only in-
tended to repair the harm caused by the offence’.334 
Admittedly, the MAR also provides for much ‘lighter’ sanctions than the afore-
mentioned severe fines (such as a public warning and the disgorgement of profits or 
avoided losses) and measures (namely a cease and desist order), but as the ECtHR 
reiterated in Grande Stevens, ‘the criminal connotation of proceedings depends on 
the degree of severity of the penalty to which the person concerned is a priori liable 
(…), and not the severity of the penalty ultimately imposed’.335 What is more, with 
respect to the possibility of issuing a public warning, the ECtHR ruled in another 
case—dealing with banking law—that it has a criminal colour especially when other, 
more severe sanctions could be imposed too (such as the withdrawal of the banking 
____________ 
330  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014, para. 97. 
331  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014, para. 97. 
332  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014, para. 98. 
333  Case C-537-16 (Grand Chamber), Garlsson Real Estate SA and Other, 20 March 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:193, paras. 34–35. 
334  Case C-537-16 (Grand Chamber), Garlsson Real Estate SA and Other, 20 March 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:193, para. 34.  
335  ECtHR, Grande Stevens v. Italy, 4 March 2014, para. 97. 
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licence or a pecuniary sanction) and considering that the warning had had a financial 
impact on the credit institution (supra, Part III, C.4.).336 
On a final note, it is also worthwhile pointing out that the circumstances NCAs 
should consider when determining the type and level of the sanctions (Article 32(1) 
of the MAR) remind us of usual sentencing principles and criteria under criminal 
law, such as the gravity and duration of the infringement, the importance of the ille-
gal profits, the degree of responsibility of the person concerned, and the previous 
infringements committed by that person. 
3.  Publication of Decisions 
As far as the publication of decisions imposing an administrative sanction or meas-
ure is concerned, one might be tempted to refer to the earlier analysis on EU banking 
law (supra, Part III, C.4.). Still, in our view, there are some important differences 
which plead more in favour of a criminal sanction or at least a hybrid measure.  
There is not only the possibility to anonymize the decision for publication and to 
defer the publication if it ‘would be disproportionate (…) or where such publication 
would jeopardise an ongoing investigation or the stability of the financial mar-
kets’,337 but it is also possible to refrain from publication if a deferral or anonymiza-
tion of the publication is deemed ‘insufficient to ensure (i) that the stability of finan-
cial markets is not jeopardized; or (ii) the proportionality of the publication of such 
decisions with regard to measures which are deemed to be of a minor nature’.338 The 
discretion to refrain from publishing when the measure or sanction is minor and the 
publication of such decision would not be proportionate suggests that the publication 
is not simply an informative measure but a sanction that could have considerable 
impact on the person concerned (and on the market, although the latter is less rele-
vant to assess the nature of the publication).  
Based on the limited information available today about the NCAs enforcement 
practices under the new MAR (supra, Part II, D.3.), it is difficult to tell whether the 
publication of sanctioning decisions actually pursues a punitive and/or deterring ef-
fect or whether it is rather of an informative (and thus administrative) nature. Still, 
what we can assess so far is that, in some cases, national authorities indeed decide 
not to publish or not to anonymize the publication. These modalities, which are 
aimed at avoiding a disproportionate effect on the offender (or spill-over effects on 
the market), seem to strengthen in our view the impression that the publication under 
the MAR can, potentially, be used as a ‘naming and shaming’ type of sanction. 
____________ 
336  ECtHR, Dubus S.A. v. France, 11 June 2009, paras. 37–38. 
337  Article 34(1), para. 3 of the MAR. 
338  Article 34(1), para. 3(c) of the MAR, emphasis added. 
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4.  Conclusion 
In sum, considering the existing case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU, the true 
nature of the administrative sanctions set forth under the MAR appears to be crimi-
nal, with some reservations for the publication of the sanctioning decisions. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the MAR provides for very substantial maximum fines, 
far-reaching and long-lasting disqualification orders, and a withdrawal of the author-
ization of investment firms—all sanctions that are likely to have severe financial 
and/or reputational impact on the offender. Considering the importance of what is at 
stake for the offender, it seems very likely that the Courts will, in the future, rule in 
this way on the sanctions under the MAR.  
To support this assessment, one may also refer to Recital 23 of the Preamble of 
the 2014 MAD, whereby the EU legislator indirectly confirms the criminal nature of 
the administrative sanctions under the MAR: 
In the application of national law transposing this Directive, Member States should ensure 
that the imposition of criminal sanctions for offences in accordance with this Directive 
and of administrative sanctions in accordance with the Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 does 
not lead to a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem. 
Indeed, if the administrative sanctions under the MAR were not of a criminal na-
ture in the meaning of Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR, there would be no need to alert 
the Member States to a violation of the ne bis in idem principle.339 Still, as recent 
case law of the CJEU shows, this does not necessarily mean that this principle will 
apply with the same stringency as in the field of ‘hard core criminal law’.340 Admit-
tedly, this case law relates to national legislation based on the 2003 MAD; so it re-
mains to be seen how the Court will rule on post-MAR legislation in the future.  
____________ 
339  For a further analysis of the application of the ne bis in idem principle in the context 
of the 2014 market abuse rules, see e.g. R. Kert, ‘The relationship between administrative 
and criminal sanctions in the new market abuse provisions’, in: F. Galli and A. Weyembergh 
(eds.), Do labels still matter? Blurring boundaries between administrative and criminal law, 
The Influence of the EU, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014, at 103–107.  
340  Case C-537-16 (Grand Chamber), Garlsson Real Estate SA and Other, 20 March 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:193, para. 63: ‘Article 50 of the Charter must be interpreted as pre-
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ings against a person in respect of unlawful conduct consisting in market manipulation for 
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given the harm caused to the company by the offence committed, such as to punish that 
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law, see G. Lo Schiavo, ‘The principle of ne bis in idem and the application of criminal 
sanctions: of scope and restrictions’, 14 EuConst 644 (2018), at 647; 650–651 and 658–663. 
See also A. Błachnio-Parzych, ‘Solution to the accumulation of different penal responsibil-
ities for the same act and their assessment from the perspective of the ne bis in idem princi-
ple’, 9 NJECL 366 (2018), at 381; K. Ligeti, ‘Fundamental Rights Protection Beyond Stras-
bourg and Luxembourg. Extending Transnational ne bis in idem Across Administrative and 
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E.   Moving Beyond Formal Labels:  
Criminal Law in Disguise 
At the end of Part III, we can affirm that most of the sanctions provided in the 
three selected areas of EU administrative law are of a criminal nature, despite the 
fact that they all carry, formally speaking, an administrative label. Even if there are 
a few remaining uncertainties with respect to some sanctions or measures (e.g. the 
publication of decisions in the field of EU banking law and EU market abuse), the 
fact that the perpetrators potentially face other ‘criminal’ sanctions is in principle 
enough to trigger the application of the criminal safeguards enshrined in the ECHR 
and the EU Charter. 
IV.  Some Reflections on Substantive and Procedural 
Safeguards in EU Administrative Criminal Law 
A.  Introduction 
After having established the criminal nature of the sanctions applicable in the three 
policy areas analysed in the previous parts, we will now turn to the implications of 
that assessment for the applicable substantive and procedural safeguards. As indi-
cated above, it is one thing to assess the criminal nature of sanctions, it is yet another 
challenge to translate that assessment into concrete applicable safeguards. 
In that respect, it is worthwhile recalling the distinction the ECtHR drew between 
‘the hard core of criminal law’ and other types of criminal law that are less stigma-
tizing. As explained above, the purpose of this distinction is crystal clear: limiting 
the scope of application of the ECHR safeguards, in particular the procedural safe-
guards of Article 6 of the ECHR.341 To the first subcategory, the so-called ‘hard core 
of criminal law’, the procedural rights under the criminal head of Article 6 of the 
ECHR apply without any restriction. In contrast, ‘the criminal-head guarantees will 
not necessarily apply with their full stringency’ to the criminal charges of the second 
subcategory.342 Whether they do depends on the ‘overarching principle of fairness 
embodied in Article 6’.343 This fairness argument is drawn from the Court’s existing 
case law regarding proceedings falling under the civil head of Article 6(1) of the 
____________ 
Criminal Procedures’, in: European Law Institute, K. Ligeti and G. Robinson (eds.), Pre-
venting and Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction in EU Criminal Law, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2018, at 165–166. 
341  Indeed, most of the relevant post-Jusilla ECtHR case law focuses on procedural safe-
guards. The scope of application of substantive safeguards seems to raise less problems. But 
to confirm this impression, further analysis would be required. 
342  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 43. 
343  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 42. 
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ECHR.344 In this case law, the Court held that the obligation of an oral hearing is not 
absolute. The Court, however, acknowledges that the fairness requirement in the 
criminal sphere is stricter.345  
The key question is therefore to what extent the criminal procedural safeguards of 
Article 6 of the ECHR apply to ‘those other criminal charges’ falling outside the 
scope of the hard core of criminal law. While the right to a fair trial applies ‘to all 
criminal proceedings, irrespective of the type of offence in issue’, it may take the 
form of different degrees of procedural protection as long as the proceedings as a 
whole are considered fair.346 So far, it seems that the ECtHR only allows limitations 
to or ‘deviations from’ the procedural rights under the criminal head of Article 6(1) 
of the ECHR under ‘exceptional circumstances’.347 
In order to avoid overlap with other contributions in this volume, which will give 
a more detailed and in-depth account of the applicable safeguards under EU admin-
istrative criminal law or some specific sectors,348 we will confine ourselves to some 
general reflections in this Part. To recall, our prime objective is to get a better overall 
understanding of the protection offered, de lege lata, under EU administrative crim-
inal law and to point out some problems.  
B.  A Fairly Limited Legal Framework 
Considering the potential far-reaching impact of the sanctions provided for under 
EU punitive administrative law, it is somewhat surprising to see how few substantive 
and procedural safeguards are spelt out by the applicable EU Regulations in the three 
selected areas. 
As regards substantive safeguards, the legal provisions remain strikingly minimal 
or are, at best, implicit. Apart from the principle of proportionality, which applies in 
____________ 
344  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, paras. 41–42. 
345  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jussila v. Finland, 23 November 2006, para. 43. 
346  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Jalloh v. Germany, 11 July 2006, para. 97 (in which the 
Court balances the right to remain silent against ‘the public interest in the investigation and 
punishment of a particular offence’). 
347  A. Bailleux, ‘The Fiftieth Shade of Grey. Competition Law, “Criministrative Law” 
and “Fairly Fair Trials”’, in: F. Galli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Do labels still matter? 
Blurring boundaries between administrative and criminal law, The Influence of the EU, 
Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014, at 147. 
348  In particular, we respectfully defer to the contributions made by Silvia Allegrezza 
(safeguards in EU banking law), Christopher Harding (safeguards in EU competition law), 
Mehmet Arslan (safeguards for criminal and administrative criminal sanctions), Lorena 
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Freiburg (18-20 June 2018). 
70 Franssen/Vandeweerd  
all three areas, particularly with regard to the sanctions (supra, Part II), very little is 
said about substantive safeguards in the respective regulations.  
When it comes to procedural safeguards, the applicable EU regulations contain 
some specific provisions, but there are important differences between the three areas. 
On the one hand, Regulation No 1/2003 and the Regulations in the field of EU bank-
ing law contain a number of procedural safeguards, such as the burden of proof 
(which is closely linked with the presumption of innocence),349 and the rights of de-
fence,350 including the right to be heard351 and the right to access to the file.352 One 
may note that the safeguards under EU banking law largely mirror the ones affirmed 
by Regulation No 1/2003, even if the former provisions tend to be more elaborated. 
By contrast, as to the right to an effective remedy, it is noteworthy that the SSM 
Regulation, unlike Regulation No 1/2003, does not grant a full review (on facts and 
on law) to the CJEU;353 indeed, the CJEU’s review is limited to the legality of the 
decisions of the ECB.354 It is questionable whether such review meets the ECtHR 
requirements. 
On the other hand, the MAR remains remarkably silent on the applicable proce-
dural safeguards in the area of market abuse. Despite the fact that the latter Regula-
tion contains quite precise minimum rules on the investigatory and sanctioning pow-
ers of NCAs, some of which are quite intrusive and have far-reaching effects on the 
persons concerned, it essentially defers to national law when it comes to procedural 
safeguards. Recital 66 of the Preamble of the MAR is most telling in this respect:  
While this Regulation specifies a minimum set of powers competent authorities should 
have, those powers are to be exercised within a complete system of national law which 
guarantees the respect for fundamental rights, including the right to privacy. For the ex-
ercise of those powers, which may amount to serious interferences with the right to respect 
for private and family life, home and communications, Member States should have in 
place adequate and effective safeguards against any abuse, for instance, where appropri-
ate a requirement to obtain prior authorisation from the judicial authorities of a Member 
State concerned. Member States should allow the possibility for competent authorities to 
____________ 
349  Article 2 of Regulation No 1/2003. 
350  Somewhat surprisingly, Article 22 of the SSM Regulation is entitled ‘due process for 
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cle 31 of the SRM Framework Regulation; Article 40(1) of the SRM Regulation. 
352  Article 27(2) of Regulation No 1/2003; Article 22(2) of the SSM Regulation; Arti-
cle 40(2) of the SRM Regulation; Article 32 of the SRM Framework Regulation. 
353  Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003 (confirming the Court of Justice’s ‘unlimited ju-
risdiction to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty 
payment’); Recital 63 of the Preamble of the SSM Regulation; Recital 121 of the Preamble 
of the SRM Regulation. 
354  Recital 60 of the Preamble of the SSM Regulation (cf. Article 13(2) of the SSM Reg-
ulation, on the review of the legality of on-site inspections). 
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exercise such intrusive powers to the extent necessary for the proper investigation of se-
rious cases where there are no equivalent means for effectively achieving the same re-
sult.355 
This gap in the EU legal framework on market abuse is to be regretted and has 
been criticized by other authors.356 As a result, EU law only harmonizes the powers 
of NCAs in order to ensure effective enforcement, but leaves it up to Member States 
to define the applicable safeguards and to ensure that those powers do not lead to a 
violation of fundamental safeguards. Of course, national law cannot go below the 
threshold of the ECHR (and the EU Charter),357 but this instrument only contains 
general minimum requirements. 
C.  Role of the Courts and Need for Legislative Clarification 
The above lack of detailed provisions on the applicable safeguards has two major 
implications. It means, one the one hand, that to the extent safeguards are not or 
hardly specified, one has to rely on existing principles and fundamental safeguards 
laid down in the EU Charter and the ECHR. On the other hand, a substantial role is 
given to the Courts to define the applicable safeguards and their precise scope.  
Obviously, there is nothing exceptional about falling back on principles and fun-
damental safeguards. Nevertheless, the peculiarity about EU administrative criminal 
law is that, apart from the general principles of EU law and the principles of good 
administration,358 it is not entirely clear which principles and rights apply: the ones 
applicable to administrative proceedings or the ones guaranteed for criminal pro-
ceedings? While some may argue that there is hardly any difference between an ad-
ministrative fair trial and a criminal fair trial,359 we beg to differ. Even if similar 
terms are used (right to a fair trial, right to an effective remedy, rights of defence, 
right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal, right to be tried within a 
reasonable time, etc.), those terms do not necessarily cover exactly the same rights. 
Furthermore, other safeguards, such as the presumption of innocence, the privilege 
____________ 
355  Emphasis added. 
356  See M. Luchtman and J. Vervaele, ‘Enforcing the Market Abuse Regime: Towards an 
Integrated Model of Criminal and Administrative Law Enforcement in the European Un-
ion?’, 5 NJECL 193 (2014), at 217. 
357  To the extent, of course, that one can argue that the situation is governed by EU law. 
While the powers of NCAs are clearly governed by EU law, it is less certain that the safe-
guards are too, especially considering the lack of provisions in that respect at EU level. See 
Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Åkerberg Fransson, 26 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, 
para. 19. 
358  See e.g. H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy 
of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 143–221. 
359  See e.g. F. Castillo de la Torre and E.G. Fournier, Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review 
in EU Competition Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017, at 294–295, paras. 6.059 and 
6.061.  
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against self-incrimination, and the ne bis in idem principle, apply only to criminal 
proceedings. 
The choice of the EU legislator to leave it up to the Courts to further define and 
ensure the protection of substantive and procedural safeguards inevitably creates a 
high degree of uncertainty. As already explained with respect to the ECtHR case law 
applying the Engel criteria and the procedural implications of the criminal nature of 
a charge or sanction (supra, Part III, A.1.), it remains quite unpredictable which safe-
guards an applicant is entitled to and to what extent. The same holds true for the case 
law of the CJEU on EU punitive administrative law, which some describe as ‘er-
ratic’.360  
In this respect, one can refer to some examples in EU competition law, where the 
EU Courts have developed extensive case law on the applicable substantive and pro-
cedural safeguards—the fruit of many years of tough litigation by (usually wealthy) 
corporate defendants that push for the application of criminal law safeguards, though 
with mixed success. The essence of what emerges from this case law is that the crim-
inal safeguards laid down in the EU Charter and the ECtHR in principle do apply, 
but not necessarily to the same extent.  
For instance, the EU Courts have confirmed the application of the presumption of 
innocence,361 but at the same time they also accept the nearly irrebuttable presump-
tion regarding parent liability.362 As we have argued elsewhere, a presumption that 
is merely based on ownership and de facto almost impossible to rebut is not compat-
ible with Article 6(2) of the ECHR, especially considering the substantial fines the 
parent company risks.363  
____________ 
360  A. Weyembergh and N. Joncheray, ‘Punitive Administrative Sanctions and Procedural 
Safeguards. A Blurred Picture that Needs to be Addressed’, 7 NJECL 189 (2016), at 197. 
361  Case C-199/92 P, Hüls v Commission, 8 July 1999, ECR I-4287, para. 150. Reiterated 
in e.g. Case T-110/07, Siemens AG v. Commission, 3 March 2011, ECLI:EU:T:2011:68, 
para. 45; Case T-348/08, Aragonesas Industrias y Energía, SAU v. Commission, 25 October 
2011, ECLI:EU:T:2011:621, para. 94 (in which case the unreliability of the evidence led to 
the annulment of part of the fining decision). See also M.J. Melícias, ‘Did They Do It?’ The 
Interplay between the Standard of Proof and the Presumption of Innocence in EU Cartel 
Investigations, 35 World Competition 471 (2012), 479 (noting that Article 48(1) EU Charter 
does not even distinguish between ‘criminal charges and other types of punitive proceed-
ings’.). 
362  For a further analysis, see V. Franssen, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability and Groups of 
Corporations. Need for a More Economic Approach?’, in: K. Ligeti and S. Tosza (eds.), 
White Collar Crime: A Comparative Perspective, Oxford/Portland, Hart, 2018, at 299–303 
and the references mentioned there. 
363  V. Franssen, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability and Groups of Corporations. Need for a 
More Economic Approach?’, in: K. Ligeti and S. Tosza (eds.), White Collar Crime: A Com-
parative Perspective, Oxford/Portland, Hart, 2018, at 303. 
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Furthermore, the EU Courts also acknowledge the applicability of the legality 
principle364 and the prohibition against retroactive criminal law enshrined in Arti-
cle 7 of the ECHR,365 but they nevertheless grant the European Commission a very 
wide margin of discretion when it comes to setting the cartel fines and the liberty to 
drastically change its fining policy as long as it respects the absolute maximum fine 
set forth by Regulation No 1/2003.366 Considering the breadth of the Commission’s 
discretion, one may express some doubts as to whether this EU case law, which ‘es-
sentially reduces’ this safeguard ‘to the requirement of statutory certainty’,367 is re-
ally in conformity with the ECtHR requirement of foreseeability, especially in the 
early years of the Commission’s tougher fining practice.368 Admittedly, by adopting 
Guidelines on Fines as well as a Leniency Notice, the Commission has limited the 
exercise of its fining discretion and made an effort to enhance transparency concern-
ing its fining practice369—yet, the same cannot be said, for instance, about the fining 
discretion exercised by the ECB.  
A final illustration of the hybrid application of criminal law standards in EU com-
petition relates to the privilege against self-incrimination. Surely, the EU courts 
many years ago already acknowledged that this privilege must be respected under 
EU competition law. Nevertheless, the protection offered by this privilege, which is 
____________ 
364  With respect to the legal definition of the offence, see Case T-299/08, Elf Aquitaine 
SA v. Commission, 17 May 2011, ECLI:EU:T:2011:217, para. 187. Regarding the legality 
of the penalty, see Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and 
C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri A/S and Others v. Commission, 28 June 2005, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:408, para. 202. 
365  This principle requires that ‘the penalties imposed correspond with those fixed at the 
time when the infringement was committed’. Case T-138/07, Schindler Holding and Others 
v. Commission, 13 July 2011, ECLI:EU:T:2011:362, para. 118, and the case law references 
mentioned there. 
366  With regard to the fact that the Commission’s fining practice has become much 
tougher over the past two decades, the General Court ruled that ‘undertakings involved in 
an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed cannot acquire a legitimate 
expectation that the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed or in 
a method of calculating the fines’. Case T-138/07, Schindler Holding and Others v. Com-
mission, 13 July 2011, ECLI:EU:T:2011:362, para. 126, with reference to Joined Cases 
C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and 
Others v Commission, emphasis added. This ruling was confirmed on appeal by the Court 
of Justice: Case C-501/11 P, Schindler Holding and Others v. Commission, 18 July 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:522, para. 75. 
367  M. Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law: Principles and Practices, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2014, at 75. 
368  See e.g. ECtHR, Camilleri v. Malta, 22 January 2013, paras. 39–43. For an analysis 
of earlier EU case law, see V. Franssen, European Sentencing Principles for Corporations, 
doctoral dissertation, Leuven, KU Leuven, 2013, at 345–348. 
369  Case C-413/08 P, Lafarge SA v. Commission, 17 June 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:346, 
para. 95. 
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strongly linked to the right to remain silent370 and which seeks to guarantee the pre-
sumption of innocence, seems to be more restricted than in the case law of the EC-
tHR.371 The EU Courts indeed limit the privilege against self-incrimination to ‘lead-
ing questions’.372 which means that ‘the Commission may not compel an undertaking 
to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the exist-
ence of an infringement which is incumbent upon the Commission to prove’.373 The 
obligation for corporations to answer any other kind of factual questions and the 
obligation to produce documents at the request of the European Commission do not 
violate the privilege against self-incrimination, and by extension the corporation’s 
rights of defence and the right to a fair trial.374 This case law is reflected in Recital 
23 of the Preamble of Regulation No 1/2003. 
If the case law in the field of EU competition law raises some questions and results 
according to some in a ‘fairly fair trial’.375 the situation is far more uncertain and 
unsatisfactory in the two other areas of EU administrative criminal law. In the field 
of EU banking law, the CJEU case law on safeguards has yet to see the light – the 
appeal proceedings against the first sanctioning decisions adopted by the ECB are 
still pending. As far as market abuse is concerned, the future development of case 
law at the EU level will strongly depend on the initiative of national courts, since the 
administrative sanctions provided by the MAR are imposed by NCAs, not by EU 
institutions or authorities. What is more, due to the lack of specific safeguards under 
the MAR, the CJEU will inevitably adopt a case-by-case approach too, assessing the 
____________ 
370  Both are implicitly enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 
371  Roughly sketched, the ECtHR has ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination 
is not an absolute right. It does in principle not extend to the use of in criminal proceedings 
of material which exists independently of the will of the suspect, such as documents or blood 
and urine samples. See e.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), O’Halloran and Francis v. United 
Kingdom, 29 June 2007, paras. 45–52. For a good overview of the ECtHR case law, see S. 
Lamberigts, ‘The Privilege against Self-incrimination. A Chameleon of Criminal Proce-
dure’, 7 NJECL 418 (2016), at 430–434. 
372  Leading questions can be defined as questions which directly ask a corporation about 
its involvement in a cartel or other prohibited agreement and which would force the corpo-
ration to admit that it has committed an infringement. Cf. A. Andreangeli, EU Competition 
Enforcement and Human Rights, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2008, at 133.  
373  Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission, 18 October 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:387, 
para. 35; Case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v. Commission, 20 February 2001, 
ECLI:EU:T:2001:61, para. 67. See also K. Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts on Evidence and Pro-
cedure in European Community Competition Law’, 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1463 (2007), 
1489. 
374  Case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v. Commission, 20 February 2001, E-
CLI:EU:T:2001:61, para. 78. See also Case C-301/04 P, Commission v. SGL Carbon AG, 29 
June 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:432, paras. 44–49. 
375  A. Bailleux, ‘The Fiftieth Shade of Grey. Competition Law, “criministrative law” and 
“fairly fair trials”’, in: F. Galli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Do labels still matter? Blurring 
boundaries between administrative and criminal law, The Influence of the EU, Brussels, 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2014, at 144–150. 
 EU Administrative Criminal Law 75 
adequacy of national safeguards in light of the EU Charter.376 This is hardly a reas-
suring position for future defendants. 
Therefore, in our view, there is a real need to clarify the applicable safeguards and 
their precise scope in the field of EU punitive administrative law, despite the reluc-
tance of the European Commission to engage in a codification of EU administrative 
law as a whole (supra, Part I). This need has already been adequately voiced by 
others: 
Instead of leaving to the judge the responsibility to clarify on a case-by-case basis which 
standard to apply, it should be for the legislator to clearly take position when adopting a 
measure liable to be qualified as sanction. It is the legislator’s responsibility to strike a 
balance between the flexibility offered by individual measures deprived of repressive as-
pects and the efficiency of punitive administrative sanctions to ensure enforcement of 
Union law, although the latter will imply a high standard of protection for the addressee, 
be it during the measure’s adoption or at the stage of judicial review. It is clear that this 
task will be particularly arduous for the legislator if one takes into account both the mul-
tiplicity of legal bases likely to lead to the adoption of punitive administrative sanctions 
and the diversity of national approaches.377 
Such legislative exercise would not only address the existing uncertainties, but 
would also create a unique opportunity to reflect on the desirability of certain safe-
guards. Considering that EU punitive administrative law does not belong to the ‘hard 
core of criminal law’ but is nonetheless of a criminal nature, and taking into account 
the need for effective enforcement and the high level of specialization of the enforc-
ing authorities, what safeguards should be respected in order to guarantee a fair trial 
in criminal matters?  
V.  Concluding Remarks:  
Some Distinctive Features of  
EU Administrative Criminal Law and Future Needs 
 
The above cross-section of three areas of EU administrative law has revealed a 
significant number of common features, despite some undeniable differences. The 
similarities are obvious with respect to the applicable sanctions (supra, Part II, E.) 
____________ 
376  For an overview of the existing CJEU case law dealing with the pre-2014 EU legal 
framework on market abuse and thus focusing on substantive law requirements, see J. Lau 
Hansen, ‘Market Abuse Case Law – Where Do We Stand With MAR?’, 2 E.C.F.R. 367 
(2017), at 373 et seq. 
377  A. Weyembergh and N. Joncheray, ‘Punitive Administrative Sanctions and Procedural 
Safeguards. A Blurred Picture that Needs to be Addressed’, 7 NJECL 189 (2016), at 208, 
with reference to J.A.E. Vervaele (2014). 
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and their criminal nature (supra, Part III, E.). Furthermore, the three areas are char-
acterised by a lacunary legal framework on substantive and, more importantly, pro-
cedural safeguards (supra, Part IV, B.). While these gaps in the legal framework 
have, to some extent, been filled and compensated by a substantial body of case law 
of the EU Courts in the field of EU competition law, such case law still has to develop 
in the other two areas.  
In each of the selected sectors, the competent authorities—whether European or 
national—have far-reaching sanctioning powers whose consequences on the natural 
or legal persons concerned are not to be underestimated. These consequences are 
predominantly of a pecuniary nature, but this does not mean they should not be taken 
seriously and equipped with appropriate safeguards. While the choice of administra-
tive tools by the EU legislator is understandable considering the constitutional con-
straints imposed by the EU Treaties, as well as the need for (highly) specialized au-
thorities and a more flexible approach, it is striking to observe that the same legislator 
has shied away from elaborating adequate procedural safeguards to counterbalance 
the powers and sanctions provided for by the EU legal framework, thereby deferring 
this hugely important and daunting task to the judiciary.  
In a period of increased scepticism about the EU’s added value and of criticism on 
so-called ‘judicial activism’, we would argue that there is a window of opportunity 
for the EU legislator to step up and reflect seriously on adequate safeguards for pu-
nitive administrative proceedings. In recent years, the EU legislator has adopted sev-
eral legal instruments clarifying common safeguards in the realm of (formal) crimi-
nal law. While this work is definitely not yet finished, the time has come to take a 
more comprehensive approach and to encompass the peripheral fields of administra-
tive criminal law, which are playing an increasingly important role in the protection 
and enforcement of ‘general interests of society’.378 This is not to say that the same 
safeguards should apply across the board—in this respect, the ECtHR’s Jussila case 
law might perhaps be a (largely unexploited) stepping stone—, but more clarity 
about the extent of the guaranteed protection against government interference is des-
perately needed.  
____________ 
378 On this topic, see also: V. Franssen and C. Harding (eds.), Criminal and Quasi-crim-
inal Enforcement Mechanisms in Europe: Origins, Concepts, Future, Oxford/Portland, Hart, 
forthcoming 2020. 
